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Enacted Legislative Findings and the Deference
Problem
DANIEL A. CRANE*
The constitutionality of federal legislation sometimes turns on the presence
and sufficiency of congressional findings of predicate facts, such as the effects of
conduct on interstate commerce, state discrimination justifying the abrogation
of sovereign immunity, or market failures justifying intrusions on free speech.
Sometimes a congressional committee makes these findings in legislative his-
tory. Other times, Congress recites its findings in a statutory preamble, thus
enacting its findings as law. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not distin-
guished between enacted and unenacted findings in deciding how much defer-
ence to accord congressional findings. This is striking because the difference
between enactedness and unenactedness is so vigorously contested on questions
of statutory interpretation, with textualists objecting to any reliance on legisla-
tive history and even purposivists conceding some risks. Both formal and
functional considerations suggest that the enactedness line should be significant
for constitutional questions as well. This is not because Congress has some
comparative advantage in finding legislative facts more reliably than other
governmental institutions, which is pervasively assumed but unrealistic. Rather,
Congress's strongest claim for judicial deference is that legislative findings are
highly normative and hence squarely within the legislative power. Recognizing
this characteristic of modern fact-finding clarifies and strengthens the claim for
deference-but only as to findings satisfying the constitutional requirements of
bicameralism and presentment.
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INTRODUCTION
Theorists of statutory interpretation fiercely contest whether judges may
legitimately rely on legislative history when interpreting statutes.' Textualists
argue that resort to legislative history distorts the role of Congress in enacting
law, subverts rule-of-law values, and may even be unconstitutional.2 Purposiv-
1. See generally Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative
History by the Rules. 122 YALE LJ. 70 (2012) (summarizing debates over reliance on legislative
history).
2. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MArfl!R oF INTIERPRETATION: FlinIRA. COURTS ANI) THE LAw 29-37
(1997) (arguing that relying on legislative history "is much more likely to produce a false or contrived
legislative intent than a genuine one"): ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, REAotNG LAw: THi.
INTERPRETATION O LEGAl TEXTs 388 (2012) ("[U]se of legislative history is not just wrong; it violates
constitutional requirements of nondelegability, bicameralism. presidential participation, and the su-
premacy of judicial interpretation...."): Frank H. Easterbrook. What Does Legislative History ell
Us?, 66 CHI-KENT L. Rliv. 441. 445 (1990) ("What distinguishes laws from the results of opinion polls
conducted among legislators is that the laws survived a difficult set of procedural hurdles and either
passed by a two-thirds vote or obtained the President's signature."): John F. Manning, Textualisin as a
Nondelegation Doctrine. 97 Co.uM. L. Ruv. 673. 738-39 (1997) (arguing that judicial reliance on
legislative history permits Congress to solve ambiguities of its own making and hence to circumvent
the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment): Adrian Vermeule. Legislative His-
tory and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church. 50 STAN. L. Rtiv.
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ists3 deny that the Constitution prohibits resort to legislative history4 and assert
that such inquiry sometimes improves interpretation of ambiguous statutes by
better honoring Congress's purposes." These debates are heated. Justice Scalia
and Judge Posner recently came to proverbial blows over Posner's assertion that
Scalia violated his textualist ideology in relying on the Second Amendment's
legislative history in District of Columbia v. Heller.6
Given the ferocity of this debate over the use of legislative history, it is
notable that the federal judiciary raises virtually no issue over the use of
legislative history in another context. Increasingly in recent years, the Supreme
Court has held that the constitutionality of a federal statute sometimes depends
on whether Congress has made findings of fact sufficient to provide a basis for
the statutory enactment.7 Responding to the increasing importance of factual
findings to constitutional validity, Congress increasingly makes such findings in
the course of enacting statutes. But it does not uniformly do so in the statutory
text. Often, the relevant findings are contained only in legislative history-
usually in a House or Senate committee report. As such, the factual findings fail
to satisfy the constitutional bicameralism and presentment criteria-the require-
ments that to become law a bill must pass both houses of Congress and be
presented to the President for signature-thought to be so important in the
statutory-interpretation context.8 Nonetheless, in deciding on constitutionality,
as opposed to interpretation, the courts seem to pay little, if any, attention to
whether the relevant congressional findings are enacted or unenacted. Congres-
sional findings seem to carry equal weight when they appear in a statute and
when they appear in legislative history.
1833, 1896 (1998) ('"The extreme volume and heterogeneity of legislative history interact with
structural constraints of the adjudicative process in ways that make courts systematically prone to
mishandle legislative history and that accordingly create distinctive risks of adjudicative error.").
3. On the -textualist" and "purposivist" terminology, see Michael C. Dorf. Foreword: The Limits of
Socratic Deliberation. 112 HARv. L. Rtiv. 4. 4 (1998) (-The Court's textualists aim to discover the
original public meaning of federal statutes and the Constitution. while purposivists treat authoritative
text as a starting point for the inference of legislative purposes that can be applied to concrete questions
not expressly addressed by the text.").
4. See. e.g.. ADRIAN VERMIFuLE, JUDiNO UNIER UNClarAINTY: AN INSTrruTIONAL THEORY ot UuAl.
INTirtminRraToN 76 (2006) (-Our sketchy Constitution, I have argued. cannot plausibly be read, on any
interpretive approach. to dictate rules of statutory interpretation...."): Peter L. Strauss. The Courts
and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political Historv?. 98 Coums. L. Ri~v. 242. 266 (1998).
5. Stephen Breyer. On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes. 65 S. CA.. L. Riv.
845, 855-56 (1992) (criticizing the Court's increasing reluctance to use legislative history). Jonathan R.
Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers. 53 VAND. L. Ri~v. 1457. 1527
(2000); Lawrence M. Solan. Private Language, Public Lais: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in
Statutory Iterpretation, 93 Gtn. L.J. 427. 485 (2005).
6. 554 U.S. 570 (2008): Richard Brust. War of the Words: Scalia and Posner Are at It Again.
A.B.A. J. (Dec. 1.2012. 3:50 AM). http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war-of-the-words scalia
and-posner areat-it_again/.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 16, 18-22.
8. See Manning, supra note 2, at 738-39 (examining the importance of bicameralism and present-
ment requirements in the context of legislative history).
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The curious phenomenon of judicial indifference to the enactedness or un-
enactedness of legislative factual findings has not passed entirely unnoticed,9
but it has never been fully explored, explained, critiqued, and confronted. This
Article seeks to provide a comprehensive and critical analysis of this phenom-
enon. To that end, it begins with a tentative claim that the significance of the
line between enactedness and unenactedness should presumptively extend to
questions of constitutionality. After all, if the views of some members of
Congress, not ratified by both houses of Congress or presented to the President,
are entitled to no or relatively little weight for purposes of statutory interpreta-
tion because they are not the law, then factual assertions by merely some
members of Congress also should be entitled to no or relatively little weight for
purposes of constitutional review.
There are many possible answers to this tentative claim. This Article seeks to
muster the most plausible ones and evaluate their strength. For heuristic pur-
poses, it classifies possible objections into two baskets-formal and functional.
The formal objections are mostly derivations of the familiar fact-law distinc-
tion that is so fundamental to jurisprudence and adjudication.'o In a nutshell,
the objections in this category reflect a view that facts and law necessarily exist
in separate domains-that facts are things objectively true in the world, whereas
law is an artificial human creation. Consequently, Congress cannot legislate
facts into existence. Facts undergo no mystical transubstantiation when they
pass the twin gauntlets of bicameralism and presentment; therefore, those
gauntlets should have no relevance when evaluating judges' reliance on legisla-
tive findings.
These formal objections are insufficient to justify erasure of the enactedness-
unenactedness line when determining the weight courts should accord con-
gressional findings. Even if Congress cannot transform facts into law,
conventional appellate norms require reviewing courts to give greater deference
to facts found through more elaborate procedural mechanisms than to those
found through less elaborate mechanisms." More fundamentally, it is far from
clear why facts enacted in a statute should not be accorded the formal dignity of
law. Although Congress cannot transform untruth into truth by legislation, the
9. See William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. Raiv. 87,
158 (2001) (arguing that if the courts want to review the legislative record, they should confine
such review to enacted findings); John F. Manning, Putting Legislative History to a Vote: A Response
to Professor Siegel, 53 VAND. L. Rtiv. 1529, 1541 (2000) (suggesting that legislative history should
be enacted as part of statutory texts if courts are to rely on it); Note, Should the Supreme Court Presume
that Congress Acts Constitutionally? The Role of the Canon of Avoidance and Reliance on Early
Legislative Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 116 HARv. L. Raiv. I798, 1808 n.70 (2003)
("Perhaps if Congress enacted findings regarding the constitutional basis for its decisions, bicameralism
and presentment would suffice to support the decisions' majoritarian legitimacy. However, Congress
rarely. if ever, enacts findings of this sort.").
10. See generally Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction.
97 Nw. U. L. Ruiv. 1769 (2003).
I1. See infra text accompanying notes 71-76.
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claim that certain facts have passed into law is not ontological or epistemologi-
cal but rather is grounded in comparative institutional advantage and democratic
legitimacy. Nor would recognizing enacted facts as law deprive courts of the
power to invalidate statutes because courts could continue to override factual
assertions by Congress under their ordinary powers of judicial review. If the
formal objections to the tentative claim are weak, three functional objections are
somewhat stronger, although ultimately unsatisfying. First, one might object
that the processes through which factual findings pass from legislative history
into statutory enactment-essentially, reconciliation in conference between the
houses of Congress, floor vote, presentment to the President, and potential veto
override-do not increase the reliability of factual findings. Probabilistically, it
is not the case that a finding of X is more likely to be true when it passes the
gauntlets of bicameralism and presentment than when it is merely asserted in a
committee report. This reliability claim is largely correct, but its force depends
on the assumption that courts should defer to congressional fact-finding because
of its comparative reliability. As argued later in this Article, that assumption is
widely held but unrealistic.
The second functional objection is that courts review congressional findings
of fact not so much to discover whether a state of the world supports the
exercise of congressional power but to determine whether Congress has acted
for an impermissible reason. But although this may be a realistic description of
some instances of judicial review, it is far from sufficient to explain the entire
practice of judicial reliance on congressional findings of fact. Nor does it erase
the importance of the enactedness-unenactedness line. A motivation expressed
through a vote by both houses of Congress and ratified by the President more
authentically represents legislative motivation than a statement reflected in mere
legislative history.
A third functional claim is that the Supreme Court's insistence on factual
findings is not grounded in a belief that Congress is a better fact-finder than
courts but in an increased willingness to defer to Congress in close constitu-
tional cases when Congress has engaged in intensive deliberation on a question.
In this view, the presence of legislative fact-finding is positively correlated with
instances where Congress has seriously engaged a question and negatively
correlated with instances where Congress has legislated on the fly. One might
conclude from this premise that courts should defer to congressional findings
that evidence meaningful legislative deliberation regardless of the form (enacted
or unenacted) in which those findings are presented. But legislative-process
considerations militate in favor of observing the enactedness line on questions
of constitutionality and on questions of interpretation. Privileging stray factual
assertions in committee reports encourages the same sort of legislative gamesman-
ship that has triggered the backlash against reliance on legislative history for
interpretation.
This brings us back full circle to the provisional assumption, which can now
be asserted with greater force. The core reason for observing the enactedness-
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unenactedness line in constitutional review is that-particularly with regard to
what Kenneth Culp Davis styled legislative facts,t 2 in contrast to adjudicative
facts-there is often a commingling of falsifiable propositions about the world
and nonfalsifiable normative assertions. Thus, for example, when Congress
asserts that violence against women has a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce, it means not merely to make the sort of empirical assertion that could be
falsified through contradictory evidence but also a normative claim about how
women should be able to participate in national economic life. Precisely be-
cause legislative facts are interwoven with normative, evaluative, or moral
content, they deserve to be treated as propositions of law for purposes of
judicial deference-but only when they are enacted as law. Conversely, legisla-
tive factual findings that do not satisfy bicameralism and presentment deserve
the same weight on questions of constitutional validity as they do on those of
statutory interpretation.
A final question is what overall effect judicial observation of the enactedness-
unenactedness line on constitutional questions would have on the legislative
process and judicial review. Would it provide a justification for yet more
muscular judicial review because the Court could disregard any findings of fact
not enacted in the statute? Or would it lead to greater judicial acquiescence in
the congressional will because Congress would learn to pack its factual predi-
cates into statutes more consistently? There are too many uncertain variables to
predict an overall effect on judicial activism or acquiescence. Nonetheless,
stressing the enactedness line could improve interactions between Congress and
the courts by incentivizing Congress to stake the constitutionality of controver-
sial statutes on concise and coherent factual assertions and inducing the courts
to accord such assertions a respectful degree of deference.
The balance of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I situates legislative
fact-finding and constitutional review, briefly examining the contexts in which
such fact-finding is relevant and presenting evidence that courts and congres-
sional draftsmen have largely failed to place weight on the enactedness-
unenactedness line. Part II considers the formal arguments that might support
erasure of the line in the constitutional-review context and rejects them as
inadequate. Part III considers the functional arguments and finds that they have
more purchase but are also insufficient. Part IV presents the affirmative case,
grounded in the normativity of legislative facts, for according congressional
fact-finding a greater degree of deference when findings are enacted than when
they are not. Finally, Part V ponders the effects of a new judicial emphasis
on the enactedness line in constitutional cases for outcomes in Congress and
the courts, the tidiness of the U.S. Code, and feedback effects on statutory
interpretation.
12. Kenneth Culp Davis. Official Notice. 62 HARv. L. Rcv. 537. 549 (1949).
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1. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE INDIFFERENCE TO THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
ENACTED AND UNENACTED CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS
A. THE DOMAIN OF CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS
Congressional findings of fact occupy an uncertain position in constitu-
tional analysis. Under current doctrine, the constitutionality of a statute rarely
depends formally on Congress having made findings sufficient to support it.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that it does not require Congress
to make findings of fact in order to sustain the constitutionality of a federal
statute, at least "absent a special concern such as the protection of free speech."' 3
This is true not only in the obvious contexts, such as classifications calling
for rational basis review where statutes are upheld if "there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classi-
fication,"' 4 but also in areas like the Commerce Clause, where in recent
decades, the Court has viewed congressional assertions of power with increas-
ing suspicion.' 5
On the other hand, in the last several decades, the Court has increasingly held
that the presence of congressional findings is often helpful in ascertaining the
constitutionality of a statute.' 6 The unadmitted corollary is that if the presence
of findings can sometimes bump a statute of doubtful constitutionality over the
line, the absence of findings can sometimes be damning. This has led some
Justices to complain that the Court is forcing Congress to play a fact-finding
role better left to the judiciary.'7
The Court has purported to conclude that congressional findings were im-
portant in sustaining the constitutionality of statutes in such contexts as the
exercise of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause' and Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment,'9 regulations of speech trenching on First Amend-
13. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 21 (2005).
14. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073. 2080 (2012) (quoting FCC v. Beach Comnic'ns,
Inc.. 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. 562-63 (1995) (-Congress normally is not
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate
commerce.").
16. See, e.g., Raich. 545 U.S. at 21 (**While congressional findings are certainly helpful in re-
viewing the substance of a congressional statutory scheme, particularly when the connection to
commerce is not self-evident, and while we will consider congressional findings in our analysis when
they are available. the absence of particularized findings does not call into question Congress' authority
to legislate.").
17. For example, Justice Powell argued in concurrence in Fullilove i. Kluznuick that requiring
Congress to make specific factual findings in support of every statute would -treat Congress as [if] it
were a lower federal court" and "mark an unprecedented imposition of adjudicatory procedures upon a
coordinate branch of Government." 448 U.S. 448. 502-03 (1980) (Powell. J.. concurring).
18. Raich. 545 U.S. at 33: FERC v. Mississippi. 456 U.S. 742. 757-58 (1982): Hodel v. Indiana.
452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981).
19. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509. 529 (2004); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs. 538 U.S. 721.
730 (2003).
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ment values,2 0 the funding of religious organizations, 2 ' and authorizing searches
that raise Fourth Amendment questions. 22 Conversely, when invalidating stat-
utes, the Court has sometimes pointed to congressional failure to make any or
sufficient findings of fact. The case that brought to the fore the Court's sporadic
affinity for findings was United States v. Lopez, in which the Court invalidated
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as outside the federal commerce
power, citing the lack of congressional findings on the effect of gun violence on
interstate commerce. The Court has since made similar holdings in other
Commerce Clause cases24 as well as cases that raise Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendment questions.2 5 In a number of cases, the Court has invalidated a
statute on constitutional grounds and rejected congressional findings as insuffi-
cient, perhaps because congressional findings would never be sufficient to
sustain such a statute2 6 or because the findings addressed the wrong questions or
failed to provide sufficient detail.2 1 In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court rejected
certain congressional findings in the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act because the
findings were incorrect or had been superseded by subsequent events28 but
nonetheless upheld the statute on other grounds.
Thus, findings of fact are double-edged swords for Congress. Their presence
can support a statute's constitutionality (because Congress found X, the statute
20. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.
93, 207-09 (2003); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 224-25 (1997).
21. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617-18 (1988).
22. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03 (1981).
23. 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995) (citing absence of congressional findings in invalidating Gun-Free
School Zones Act on Commerce Clause grounds). By the time of the Lopez decision, Congress had
enacted findings, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§§ 320904(2)(F)-(G), 108 Stat. 1796, 2125 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(1)(F)-(G)
(Supp. 11 1995)), but the majority apparently believed that only factual findings contemporaneous with
the enactment of the statute under which the defendant was charged could be relevant to the
constitutional analysis. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) ("[S]imply because Congress may
conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it
so." (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557)).
25. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000): Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642-45 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507. 536
(1997).
26. Cf Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 433 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (pointing to findings in legislative history supporting restrictions on corporate
political contributions pursuant to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002).
27. Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 132 S. Ct. 1327. 1335-38 (2012) (reviewing statutory findings
under the Family Medical Leave Act and holding that Congress had not made findings about gender-
discriminatory impact that would justify upholding the statute's self-care provisions under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369-72 (2001)
(declining to permit abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity because Congress failed to make
findings of irrational discrimination against the disabled by states).
28. 550 U.S. 124, 165-66 (2007) (holding that congressional findings made in congressional
findings but not included in the statute were insufficient to sustain the constitutionality of the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act, where some of the findings were incorrect and some had been superseded).
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is constitutional),29 their absence can be cited in invalidating a statute (because
Congress did not find X, the statute is unconstitutional), and their presence can
even be cited as affirmative evidence for the unconstitutionality of a statute
(because Congress found X, the statute is unconstitutional). A recent example of
these tensions appears in the Supreme Court's landmark decision narrowly
upholding the individual mandate requirement of the Affordable Care Act
(ACA). 3 0 Chief Justice Roberts's tie-breaking opinion-finding the individual
mandate outside of Congress's Commerce Clause power but within its taxing
power and thus ultimately constitutional-does not rely at all on congressional
findings.3 ' Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion-arguing that the individual
mandate was within the commerce power-relied extensively on Congress's
findings regarding the economic effects of uninsured patients. Dissenting from
the holding that the individual mandate could be upheld as a tax, Justice Scalia
also pointed to the congressional findings, noting that "several of Congress'
legislative 'findings' with regard to § 5000A confirm that it sets forth a legal
requirement and constitutes the assertion of regulatory power, not mere taxing
power."33 Thus, for some Justices the findings supported constitutionality, for
others they pointed to unconstitutionality, and for one, the tiebreaker, they
apparently did not matter at all.
It may be that all of this rhetoric about the significance of congressional
findings is just that-rhetoric-and that neither the presence nor the absence of
findings has dispositive weight in constitutional adjudication.34 The Court's
increased focus on the presence, absence, and sufficiency of congressional
findings may have little weight in the decision of cases and may be merely an
evolving rhetorical element that, like other doctrines and forms of justification,
masks the true basis of decision. Some critics view the Court's recent emphasis
on findings as something approaching a cynical ploy, noting, for example, that
the conservative majority chided Congress for the absence of findings in
striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez but then, when Con-
gress obliged with elaborate findings supporting the Violence Against Women
29. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (deferring to congressional finding
regarding women in the military); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31-34 (1976)
(deferring to a congressional finding that X-ray evidence was not reliable for disability claims);
Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 425-30 (1974) (deferring to a congressional determination that
drug addicts with two prior felony convictions were less likely to be rehabilitated).
30. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2611-12 (Ginsburg, J.. concurring in part. concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (placing weight on Congress's numerous findings in the statute's preamble).
33. Id. at 2652 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (placing weight on Congress's numerous findings in the
statute's preamble).
34. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the
Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactnent Costs, I 18 YAii L.J. 2, 48 (2008) (-After the Supreme
Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison, it is not clear whether congressional findings have any
significant effect on the probability that a purported congressional exercise of the Commerce Clause
power will be upheld.").
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Act, dismissed the findings as insufficient in Morrison.3 5
It would be a mistake, however, to characterize the Supreme Court's recent
interest in legislative findings solely based on clearly patterned conservative-
liberal divides over the scope of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Assertions about congressio-
nal findings have not been solely the province of conservative Justices seeking
to narrow the scope of Congress's regulatory powers. Congressional findings
have played a role in decisions upholding statutes that more closely track the
political preferences of the Court's more liberal Justices (such as civil rights
statutes, political-donation bans, and cable-company regulation),36 upholding
statutes that track the political preferences of the conservatives (such as anti-
terrorism statutes and funding for religious organizations), 37 and in a variety of
cases (such as those involving homegrown marijuana and child pornography)
with ambiguous ideological identification. In an abortion case in which the
Court narrowly upheld a federal statute, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
and Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion both discredited Congress's findings
of fact.3 ' Further, unlike on other methodological issues, such as the relevance
of legislative history in interpreting statutes,40 the Framer's intent on the
35. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 89 lowA L. Ri~v. 1487, 1499 n.51 (2004) (asserting that "Morrison revealed the absence-of-
findings criticism to be close to a make-weight"); see also Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and
Stealth Constitutional Decision Making, 98 lowA L. Riv. 465, 473 (2013); A. Christopher Bryant &
Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Courts New "On the Record" Constitu-
tional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORN-j. L. Riv. 328, 343-44 (2001); Dan T. Coenen, The
Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L.
Riev. 1281, 1322 (2002); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. Rmiv. 80, 128
(2001); Gil Seinfeld, The Possibility of Pretext Analysis in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 78 NoTR
DAME L. Ruv. 1251, 1271 (2003); Note, Judicial Review of Congressional Factfinding, 122 HARv. L.
Rivv. 767, 770-71 (2008).
36. E.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509. 533-34 (2004) (upholding Title 11 of the Americans with
Disabilities Act as applied to access to state courts as a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 powers);
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (upholding a soft-money political-donation ban); Nev.
Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003) (upholding application of the Federal Family
and Medical Leave Act to state employees): Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 224-25
(1997) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to cable must-carry provisions).
37. E.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. 130 S. Ct. 2705. 2712, 2731 (2010) (upholding
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prohibiting citizens from providing
"material support or resources" to certain foreign organizations that support terrorist organizations);
Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens. 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990) (upholding the Equal Access Act against an
Establishment Clause challenge); Bowen v. Kendrick. 487 U.S. 589. 622 (1988) (upholding the
Adolescent Family Life Act against an Establishment Clause challenge).
38. E.g., Gonzales v. Raich. 545 U.S. 1. 32-33 (2005) (finding a California statute authorizing use of
medical marijuana constitutionally preempted by the Federal Controlled Substances Act).
39. Gonzales v. Carhart. 550 U.S. 124, 165-66 (2007) (rejecting certain congressional findings in the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act): id. at 174-75 (Ginsburg. J.. dissenting) ("The congressional findings
on which the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act rests do not withstand inspection . . .
40. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
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meaning of the Constitution, or the consultation of foreign law in interpreting
the Constitution,42 there is no clear line of ideological demarcation over the
relevance of congressional findings. Justices on both sides of the political
spectrum freely invoke the presence or absence of congressional findings
without engaging in methodological contestation over the propriety of consider-
ing such findings.
Congressional findings thus occupy an uncertain position in modern constitu-
tional jurisprudence. They are seldom required, sometimes helpful, and some-
times hurtful to the constitutionality of a statute. Justices on both sides of the
political spectrum cite the presence, sufficiency, and absence of legislative
findings in explaining their votes. Legislative findings are thus ubiquitous and
ideologically unidentifiable properties in modern constitutional litigation.
B. CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL INDIFFERENCE TO THE
ENACTEDNESS-UNENACTEDNESS LINE
If congressional findings are sometimes relevant to constitutional analysis,
then it is important to know what counts as a congressional finding. Apart from
those rare impeachment cases where Congress sits as an adjudicatory body, 4 3
Congress has no obvious mechanisms for expressing findings of fact. Congress
has extensive investigatory powers-such as issuing subpoenas and holding
hearings-and these functions can result in the preparation of documents contain-
ing assertions of fact. 4 But does every assertion of fact contained in a docu-
ment prepared by a member of Congress constitute a finding of Congress for
purposes of constitutional analysis? Or has Congress only found a fact when it
has expressed that finding in a bill that has received a majority vote in both
houses and has been signed by the President, or if the President vetoes the bill,
that has been overridden by the requisite two-thirds supermajority?
This question has obvious resonance with contemporary debates over the
role of legislative history in statutory interpretation. Textualists insist that courts
should rarely, if ever, consider congressional findings or other statements in
legislative history-including in official documents like committee reports-
when interpreting statutes.45 They insist that courts limit their inquiry to the
texts Congress has actually enacted. Purposivists would admit some use of
legislative history, although continuing to recognize the primacy of the statutory
41. See. e.g., Michael W. McConnell. Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualisn and
Originalisin?, 119 HAwv. L. Ri:v. 2387, 2413 (2006) (book review) (discussing originalism and its
alternatives).
42. See Roper v. Simmons. 543 U.S. 551. 575-78 (2005) (citing foreign legal precedents in
interpreting the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment).
43. See generally Wu.AAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQumisTs: Ti: HisioRic IMrEACHMIENTS 01: Jusnci
SAMUEl CHASI AND PRIDtimNT ANDREw JOHNSON (1992).
44. Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review': A Preliminarv
Analysis. 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1179-80 (2001) (describing institutional resources available to Congress
to conduct fact-linding).
45. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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text. 4 6 Given that, on interpretation, the range of disagreement within the
mainstream of contemporary American legal discourse falls somewhere be-
tween a flat prohibition on consulting unenacted congressional findings and a
willingness to consider congressional findings sometimes,4 7 one might expect a
similar range of perspectives on the consultation of congressional findings on
questions of constitutionality. We thus might expect textualists to assert that
only enacted congressional findings-those that satisfy bicameralism and present-
ment-can count toward or against constitutionality and purposivists to argue
that under some circumstances unenacted findings (that is, those appearing only
in legislative history) could be considered. In fact, the line between enacted and
unenacted legislative findings seems to be almost completely unimportant in
contemporary constitutional litigation. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court
seems to consider the line significant. The practice in Congress-at least at the
level of the legislative counsels' offices-seems to be to avoid enacting findings
on the theory that enacted findings just clutter statutes, and findings in com-
mittee reports are just as effective at establishing predicate facts. The House
Legislative Counsel's Manual on Drafting Style discourages legislative drafters
from including findings and purposes in the text of the Act, opining that "[b]oth
are matters that are more appropriately and safely dealt with in the committee
report than in the bill."4 8 Similarly, the Senate Office of the Legislative Coun-
sel's Legislative Drafting Manual suggests that a "section of findings may
contain statements that would be more appropriate to include in a committee
report" but also notes that "findings are often important to a client and may be
used by a client to convey policy." 4 9
Of course, when constitutionality is on the line, Congress will draft statutes
with an eye to mustering votes on the Court, and should it perceive that enacting
findings matters to the Justices, it might consider enacting more of its findings.
But the Court has given Congress little incentive to care about whether factual
findings are enacted or simply appear in committee reports. Justices on both
sides of the ideological spectrum-both in a raw political sense and in the more
contextually relevant sense of textualism and purposivism-freely discuss con-
gressional findings without distinguishing between those that are enacted and
those that are not.
In order to examine this phenomenon, imagine a two-by-two grid classifying
the cases in which the Court purports to consider legislative findings in deciding
46. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
47. It is hard to even find proponents of legislative history who express their support without
qualification. For example, during her confirmation hearings, Justice Ginsburg referred to her approach
to legislative history as "hopeful skepticism." Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, To Be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. 224 (1993).
48. OFFICl OF THiE LEGISLATIVE CouNSll., U.S. Housli or Ria'RassnA-nvEis, HLC 104-1. Hous: Li:cusI.A-
TIVE COUNSEL'S MANUAl ON DRAFTING STYLE § 325 (1995).
49. Oiricl or Tr Liris.rATIvE CouNsEl., U.S. SENATE Lialsi.ATivi: DRAFTING MANUAl. § 124 (1997).
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the constitutionality of a federal statute. In each case, the Court could sustain or
invalidate the statute, and in each case, the relevant legislative findings could be
enacted or unenacted.50 A number of recent Supreme Court decisions populate
each box in the grid. The Court sometimes upholds statutes based on enacted
legislative findings,5 ' sometimes upholds statutes based on unenacted legisla-
tive findings, 52 sometimes invalidates statutes holding enacted findings insuffi-
cient, and sometimes invalidates statutes holding unenacted findings
50. In some cases, there may be a question as to whether the findings are enacted or not. For
example, in the Child Online Protection Act and the Child Pornography Prevention Act, Congress
embedded factual findings in the public law but not in the text of the statute that appears in the U.S.
Code. Instead, the findings were embedded in the Code's statutory notes, as though the findings were
merely legislative history. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 668, 673 (2004) (affirming a
preliminary injunction against application of the Child Online Protection Act, where Congress made
findings in public law but not in the statute); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240, 244-45,
257-58 (2002) (invalidating portions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act, which criminalized
sexual depictions of children created by computer imaging and included congressional findings in
public law). Because the version of a statute appearing in the Statutes at Large and not the U.S. Code is
the authoritative version of the bill, U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S.
439, 448 (1993), it would seem that the relevant findings should count as "enacted" so long as they
were part of the enrolled text sent to the President.
51. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712, 2724-26, 2731 (2010) (upholding
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prohibiting provision of "material
support or resources" to certain foreign organizations that support terrorist organizations based on
statutory findings about threats of international terrorism); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 21-22,
28-29, 32-33 (2005) (finding a California statute authorizing use of medical marijuana constitutionally
preempted by the Federal Controlled Substance Act, in part because of enacted congressional findings
regarding effects of locally grown and consumed narcotics); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721, 730, 735 & n. 11 (2003) (upholding application of the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act
to state employees based on enacted statutory findings); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180,
224-25 (1997) (relying on both statutory findings and findings in legislative history to reject a First
Amendment challenge to cable must-carry provisions); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593, 595,
602-04 (1988) (relying on enacted statutory findings in upholding the Adolescent Family Life Act
against an Establishment Clause challenge); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 753-56 (1982)
(upholding provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act against a Commerce Clause
challenge and relying in part on enacted statutory findings): Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03
& n.7 (1981) (upholding warrantless inspections authorized by the Mine Safety and Health Act against
a Fourth Amendment challenge and relying in part on enacted findings).
52. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509. 526, 533-34 (2004) (upholding Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act as applied to access to state courts as a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 powers
and relying in part on unenacted congressional findings); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 119-20 &
n.5 (2003) (upholding soft-money political-donation bans based in part on unenacted congressional
findings); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250-51, 253 (1990) (upholding the Equal Access Act
against an Establishment Clause challenge and relying on unenacted congressional findings that
students below college level are able to distinguish between state and private religious speech); Hodel
v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-26 (1981) (upholding application of the Surface Mining Act against a
Commerce Clause challenge based in part on unenacted congressional findings); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309. 337 (1966) (sustaining provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
based on unenacted findings of Congress contained in committee reports and floor debates).
53. Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1335-38 (2012) (reviewing statutory findings
under the Family Medical Leave Act and holding that Congress had not made findings about
gender-discriminatory impact that would justify upholding the statute's self-care provisions under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
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insufficient. 54 It seems to have no greater propensity to uphold a statute based
on an enacted finding than an unenacted one, nor does it dismiss unenacted
findings more lightly than enacted ones. Most significantly, the textualists on
the Court, who otherwise pour such effort into deriding consultation of legisla-
tive history, have not made an issue of a congressional finding's unenactedness.
It is therefore unsurprising that purposivist judges, who do not have the same
aversion to legislative history, have not raised the issue either.
Consider, for example, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Board of
Education v. Mergens, joined in relevant part by Justices Rehnquist, White, and
Blackmun.55 The issue was whether the Federal Equal Access Act could consti-
tutionally require secondary schools to allow religious student groups to meet
on campus like other clubs.5 6 Plaintiffs claimed that secondary students could
easily be led into believing that the school itself was endorsing religious
speech.5 The Senate Report on the Equal Access Act contained an assertion
that "students below the college level are capable of distinguishing between
State-initiated, school sponsored, or teacher-led religious speech on the one
hand and student-initiated, student-led religious speech on the other."68 The
plurality relied on this finding in affirming the statute's constitutionality, observ-
ing that given "the deference due 'the duly enacted and carefully considered
decision of a coequal and representative branch of our Government,' we do not
lightly second-guess such legislative judgments, particularly where the judg-
ments are based in part on empirical determinations."59 That the "coequal and
representative branch" was just a committee of one house of Congress did not
seem to matter.
Even the usually textualist judges have generally seemed to assume that
369-71, 374 (2001) (declining to permit abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity because
Congress failed to make findings of irrational discrimination by states against the disabled).
54. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360-61 (2010) (rejecting FEC efforts to restrict corporate
political contributions pursuant to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and rejecting unen-
acted congressional findings as insufficient to justify restrictions on corporate speech); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614-15 (2000) (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act and finding
insufficient congressional findings in House and Senate conference reports); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89-91 (2000) (finding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
did not validly abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity where -review of the [Act's] legislative
record as a whole" revealed no basis for believing that states were discriminating against their
employees based on age); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 635-36, 642-45 (1999) (holding that the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification
Act did not validly abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity because the legislative
history included insufficient congressional findings on state infringement of patents): Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary' Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 654-56 (Stevens, J.. dissenting) (arguing that i[t]he
legislative history of the Patent Remedy Act makes it abundantly clear that Congress was attempting to
hurdle . . . the 'clear statement' rule").
55. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
56. Id. at 231.
57. Id. at 249.
58. Id. at 250-51 (quoting S. Riw. No. 98-357, at 35 (1984)).
59. Id. at 251 (citations omitted) (quoting Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors. 473 U.S.
305, 319 (1985)).
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congressional findings play the same role in constitutional analysis whether
they are enacted or unenacted. Take, for example, Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, holding
that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act could not constitutionally be
applied against the states.6 o Congress had enacted a series of statutory findings
about employer discrimination against the disabled," but none of them explic-
itly mentioned state employers. Evidence of discrimination by states had been
submitted to the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with
Disabilities, but the task force itself made no findings with respect to state
employers. Justice Rehnquist's opinion found it significant that Congress did
not incorporate any of the evidence concerning state discrimination in its
legislative findings, 64 but the opinion did not seem to find it important that the
relevant findings were missing from the statute as opposed to the House and
Senate reports. To the contrary, the majority cited language from the House and
Senate reports concerning discrimination by private employers and concluded
from those sources that Congress affirmatively rejected the assertion that states
were guilty of disability-based employment discrimination. Thus, the absence
of findings in legislative history was ostensibly important in finding application
of the statute to the states unconstitutional.
An even more poignant example of indifference to the enactedness-
unenactedness line by the Court's textualists appears in Bartnicki v. Vopper,
where the Court invalidated application of the federal wiretap act to prohibit
intentional disclosure of illegally obtained communication of public impor-
tance. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Scalia
and Thomas, scolding the majority for disregarding congressional findings that
disclosure of the illegally obtained information was necessary to deter illegal
wiretapping.67 The dissenters advocated giving deference to Congress's institu-
tional advantage in evaluating "the vast amounts of data bearing upon complex
issues" and argued against "reweigh[ing] . . . de novo" congressional findings.6"
Significantly, all of the relevant findings of fact appeared in House and Senate
reports-in mere legislative history, of which Justice Scalia has said on other
occasions, "The more you use legislative history, the phonier it will become."
60. 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
62. Bd. ofTrs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett. 531 U.S. 356, 370-71 (2001).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 372 (finding House and Senate reports to be "strong evidence that Congress' failure to
mention States in its legislative findings addressing discrimination in employment reflects that body's
judgment that no pattern of unconstitutional state action had been documented").
66. 532 U.S. 514. 517-18 (2001).
67. Id. at 549-50 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 550.
69. Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional Interpreation,
80 Giro. WASH. L. Riv. 1610. 1612 (2012).
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The textualists did not stop to explain why they would find unenacted congressio-
nal findings important to sustaining the constitutionality of the statute when
those findings could not be used to explain the meaning of the statute.
To point out that textualists refuse reliance on legislative history in one
context and admit it in another is not to prove that textualists are inconsistent.
There may be valid reasons-such as the functional considerations discussed in
Part III-that relying on legislative history to interpret a statute raises different
issues than relying on it to sustain the constitutionality of a statute. Of course, it
could also be that the textualists are inconsistent and also wrong in two ways:
first, in refusing to entertain helpful information to decipher congressional intent
in cases of statutory ambiguity; and second, in demanding extensive findings
from Congress in constitutional cases. But before reaching any conclusions, it is
necessary to consider the kinds of justifications that explain the phenomenon of
judicial indifference to the enactedness-unenactedness line in constitutional
cases.
II. FORMAL CONSIDERATIONS
In examining why the enactedness-unenactedness line is observed on ques-
tions of interpretation but not on questions of constitutional validity, the obvious
place to begin is with the pervasive and slippery distinction between fact and
law, a distinction that has important consequences for such matters as the
allocation of decision making between judges and juries and between trial
judges and appellate judges.70 It may be that the line between enactedness and
unenactedness matters for interpretation because congressional mandates can
only become law by virtue of bicameralism and presentment but factual asser-
tions cannot become law even if they pass bicameralism and presentment. In
that case, their failure to pass those hurdles is irrelevant to questions of
constitutional validity where the question is the existence of certain factual
predicates.
It is doubtful that these kinds of formal considerations drive the distinction,
but if they do, they should not. First, even if congressional findings forever
occupy the domain of fact-whether enacted or unenacted-this is not a
sufficient reason to hold enacted and unenacted facts equal. Courts routinely
accord greater weight to facts found through more elaborate processes than facts
found through less elaborate ones because they are more likely to be true.
Second, there is no sound reason that facts enacted by Congress should not take
on the formal character of law, which would then justify according greater
deference to enacted facts than to unenacted ones.
A. THE FACT-LAW DISTINCTION: FACTS AS FACTS
The idea that the enactedness of statutory findings should matter in constitu-
70. On the fact-law distinction, see generally Allen & Pardo, supra note 10.
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tional adjudication does not depend on a view that enacted findings-those that
satisfy bicameralism and presentment-are somehow law, whereas unenacted
findings are not. Enacted findings, could still be "facts" and yet be entitled to
greater deference than unenacted findings because more stringent processes
produced the enacted findings, and the full Congress and the President, instead
of just a committee, found them to be true.
In ordinary litigation, reviewing courts purport to give greater or lesser
deference to facts found by others based on the stringency and character of the
processes that produced them. Courts reviewing facts found by administrative
agencies in informal adjudication apply an "arbitrary and capricious" standard,
unless the agency's organic statute requires a different measure of review.7' The
court's "inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful."7 2 Courts apply a
"substantial evidence" standard when reviewing factual findings by administra-
tive agencies in formal adjudication,7 3 which requires "such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."74
When reviewing factual findings by judges or juries, appellate courts apply a
"clearly erroneous" standard. The clearly erroneous standard is, in principle at
least, more deferential to the fact-finder.
7 1. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?,
63 AnMIN. L. Ruiv. 77, 80-81 (2011).
72. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), abrogated on other
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
73. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (stating that a "reviewing court shall...
hold unlawful and set aside agency . . . findings . . . found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evi-
dence"); see also NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 292 (1965) ("[Djue deference is to be rendered to
agency determinations of fact, so long as there is substantial evidence to be found in the record as a
whole."); O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc. 340 U.S. 504, 508 (1951) ("[F]indings are to be
accepted unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.");
NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc. 337 U.S. 217, 220 (1949) ("[F]indings [of fact] are binding
upon [reviewing courts] to the extent that they are sustained by substantial evidence."); 73A C.J.S.
Public Administrative Law and Procedure §§ 444-48 (2013).
74. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
75. Fin. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's
opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility."); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948) ("A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.").
76. In Dickinson v. Zurko, the Supreme Court stated:
This Court has described the APA court/agency "substantial evidence" standard as requiring a
court to ask whether a "reasonable mind might accept" a particular evidentiary record as
"adequate to support a conclusion." It has described the court/court "clearly erroneous"
standard in terms of whether a reviewing judge has a "definite and firm conviction" that an
error has been committed. And it has suggested that the former is somewhat less strict than the
latter.
527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (citations omitted) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N. Y, 305 U.S. at 229; U.S.
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 395); see also Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir.
1999) (stating that substantial evidence review "is less deferential than the 'clearly erroneous' stan-
dard").
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In practice, the difference between these standards of review may be more
semantic than real, 7 although in some cases, the specification of the standard of
review will make a difference.7 ' The important point for present purposes is that
the degree of formal judicial deference to fact-finding depends on the nature of
the fact-finding. Facts that have passed more stringent procedural gauntlets,
such as the notice and opportunity to be heard required in formal adjudication in
administrative procedures79 or cross-examination and the rules of evidence in
civil litigation, are accorded formally greater weight. Enacted factual assertions
by Congress that have passed formal gauntlets-bicameralism and presentment-
might also be accorded greater weight in judicial analysis than unenacted
findings that have not passed those gauntlets.
Indeed, from a formal perspective, factual assertions in committee reports or
other legislative history arguably should not count as findings of Congress at all.
Because Congress can only act in a legislative capacity through the constitution-
ally specified means of bicameralism and presentment, Congress itself has not
found anything when a House or Senate report contains an assertion of fact, just
as Congress itself has not acted legislatively when merely one house disap-
proves executive action.so It is odd to hear the textualist dissenters in Bartnicki
complain that the majority has improperly "reweighed" the findings of Congress
77. See Cataj v. Gonzales, 140 F. App'x 600. 605 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he outcome would be the
same whether the evidence was reviewed under the clearly erroneous or the substantial evidence
standard."); Menendez-Donis v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Under [the clearly
erroneous] standard, we can overturn factual findings that we conclude are clearly wrong even though
they are not unreasonable. In contrast, under the substantial evidence standard we cannot substitute our
determination for that of the administrative fact-finder just because we believe that the fact-finder is
clearly wrong."); J.N. Moser Trucking, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 306 F. Supp. 2d 774, 782 n.10
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (noting that the clearly erroneous standard demands closer judicial scrutiny than the
substantial evidence standard); Roberson v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 135, 146 (2003) ("While conven-
tional wisdom says that an agency is to receive less deference under the 'clearly erroneous' formula, the
distinction may be more theoretical than practical."): Pierce, supra note 71, at 84-86 (summarizing
literature suggesting that the formal standard of review is not a significant factor in judicial deference in
the review of fact-finding); Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or "The Deciders"-The Courts in Admninistra-
tive Law, 75 U. CHI. L. Rjav. 815, 822-23 (2008) (discussing the difficulty of finding practical differences
between clearly erroneous review and substantial evidence review); Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of
Scope of Review Standands, 44 WM. & MARY L. Riev. 679, 688 (2002) (showing that clearly erroneous and
substantial evidence review are both "middle standards" and result in similar outcomes).
78. In Zurko, the Supreme Court. discussing the distinction between the substantial evidence and
clearly erroneous standards of review, noted that it had "failed to uncover a single instance in which a
reviewing court conceded that use of one standard rather than the other would in fact have produced a
different outcome." 527 U.S. at 162-63. The Sixth Circuit has also stated:
All cases that require reversal under the "compelled to conclude to the contrary" substantial
evidence standard also require reversal under the clearly erroneous standard. Most cases that
require affirmance under the substantial evidence standard also require affirmance under the
clearly erroneous standard. In a small subset of cases, however, a case that requires reversal
under the clearly erroneous standard might still require affirmance under the "compelled to
conclude to the contrary" substantial evidence standard.
Sarr v. Gonzales, 127 F. App'x 815, 819 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005).
79. Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-57 (2012).
80. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-59 (1983) (invalidating unicameral legislative veto).
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when the relevant findings were merely those of congressional committees and
not those of the legislature itself.8 ' When speaking of interpretation, Justice
Scalia has complained that it is "naive" and incorrect to refer to statements
in a committee report as the expressions of Congress itself.82 If a committee
report is not the "view of Congress" when it comes to the interpretation of a
statute, how can it become the view of Congress for purposes of examining the
constitutionality of a statute?
B. THE FACT-LAW DISTINCTION: FACTS AS LAWS
When Congress embeds enumerated factual findings in a statute, it makes
them formally part of the statute. The act begins with a title, which is itself part
of the statute, followed by an enacting clause and any findings of fact.84 The
Supreme Court has recognized that enacted congressional findings "are a part of
the statute.""
Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether enacted findings have the force of law. In
a Fourth Circuit decision upholding the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),
which was ultimately reversed by an en banc court and the Supreme Court in
Morrison, the two-judge majority noted that the original text of the bill con-
tained even more elaborate findings of fact than those ultimately embedded in
the statute. The panel explained that these findings "were removed to the
conference report only to avoid cluttering the U.S. Code with 'congressional
findings that had no force of law.'" 87
Why should part of an enacted statute have "no force of law"? One could
81. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 549-50(2001) (Rehnquist, C.J.. dissenting).
82. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 510 (2006) (Scalia. J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). In Zedner. Justice Scalia stated:
To begin with, it accustoms us to believing that what is said by a single person in a floor
debate or by a committee report represents the view of Congress as a whole-so that we
sometimes even will say (when referring to a floor statement and committee report) that
"Congress has expressed" thus-and-so. There is no basis either in law or in reality for this
naive belief.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 516-17 (1993)).
83. Early decisions stating that a title is "no part of a statute," Patterson v. Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 172
(1903), have been superseded by statements to the effect that the title is part of the statute but cannot
override the operative portions of the statute. United States v. Spears, 697 F.3d 592. 597 (7th Cir. 2012).
84. LISA SCHUirt BRISSMAN, EnwARD L. RuniN & KiviN M. STACK. THE Ra;i uATORY STwi 129-35
(2010) (discussing the architecture of modern congressional statutes).
85. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 45 (1989).
86. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 967 n.10 (4th Cir. 1997), rev'd
en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
87. Id. (citing DAvin FRAZIEE, ANN M. Nolin & ANDREA BRENNI:KlI, ViiENE AGAINST WOMEN: LAv
AND LrTiGAToN § 5:40 (1997)). The panel added:
VAWA. of course, was enacted before Iopez. when the necessity of expressly finding that
regulated activity had a "substantial effect" upon commerce (rather than just an "effect") was
not altogether clear. Thus, it is particularly telling that in passing VAWA Congress found that
gender-based violence against women does -substantially affect" interstate commerce.
Id.
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give a number of answers, all hearkening back to the fact-law distinction. None
of them are satisfying.
First, one might lodge an essentialist objection to the effect that the categories
of fact and law are necessarily and logically distinct and, hence, that an
assertion in the domain of fact is inherently incapable of becoming law. In this
view, law is the artificial creation of human institutions, whereas facts are things
that are true in the world.88 Congress has no power to change the truth of fact
through enactment. If the sky is blue, it does not become green no matter how
many times Congress may find in a statute that it is.
Although assertions do not become true just because Congress says they are
true, it makes little sense to think of the line between fact and law as epistemo-
logical or ontological.89 No process of fact determination in the political or
legal sphere makes facts true in the world. At most, judicial and political
processes can make assertions of fact conclusive for purposes of a particular
legal or political function. When a jury finds the defendant guilty of a crime and
the highest reviewing court finds the jury's determination not clearly erroneous,
the fact of the defendant's guilt is conclusively established for purposes of the
litigation. But of course, the defendant may not have committed the crime.
By the same token, Congress could enact facts as law, thus making the facts
conclusive for litigation purposes without entailing any epistemological claim
that the facts are necessarily true in the world. 90 Indeed, legislatures commonly
enact conclusive or irrebuttable presumptions that have the effect of establish-
ing facts in litigation beyond disputation.9 ' It would not violate any established
legal convention to hold that facts enacted in a statute are conclusive because
they have passed into the domain of law and thus achieved an impregnability
from challenge, regardless of whether they are in fact true in the world.
88. Ken Kress, Modern Jurisprudence, Postinodern Jurisprudence, and Truth, 95 MICH. L. Riv.
1871, 1915 (1997) (reviewing DiNNIS PArTiRSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996)). Professor Patterson has
stated:
Propositions of law are not true in virtue of criteria specified by the rule of recognition. The
forms of argument-the grammar of legal justification-are the means by which the truth of
legal propositions is shown. There are no legal truths-no true propositions of law-outside
these forms of argument. This is why the positivist's criterial test of legal truth misses the
mark. Propositions of law are not [true] in virtue of anything; not social facts, legislative facts,
nor facts of past institutional decisions (e.g., prior judicial decisions).
Id. (quoting PArniRSON, supra, at 67-68).
89. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 10, at 1770-71 (arguing that the line between fact and law is not
ontological or epistemological but rather functional).
90. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Coium. L. Ruiv. 229, 234 (1985)
(arguing that the distinction between fact and law depends not on a "properly affixed characterization"
but rather on "other factors, such as the nature of the substantive issue and the character of the
decisionmakers").
91. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 398 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing
statutes that contain irrebuttable presumptions that a person who possesses drugs has intent to
distribute); Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291, 297 (1995) (discussing the conclusive
presumption in the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act that certain injuries result in
incapacity to earn income).
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This raises a second potential objection to thinking of enacted legislative
findings as law-that such a principle would permit Congress to circumvent
judicial review by embedding questionable assertions of fact into a statute.92
The Supreme Court has long asserted that it "retains an independent constitu-
tional duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake."93
If thinking of factual findings in a statute as law meant that those factual
assertions would become impervious to judicial review, even in constitutional
cases, that would effectuate a dramatic power shift from the courts to Congress.
But treating enacted findings as law and hence "conclusive" need not pre-
clude judicial review. The courts routinely strike down statutes as unconstitu-
tional and could similarly strike down facts in the course of reviewing statutes.
Indeed, they already do. Courts strike down conclusive statutory presumptions
of fact when they violate constitutional principles, for example, by classifying
people based on impermissible considerations.94 And the courts sometimes hold
that facts found by Congress are unfounded or erroneous.95 To say that a fact
has the dignity of law is not to say that it is immune from judicial review,
although it might be entitled to greater deference from courts than other kinds of
assertions by Congress, such as legislative history or assertions made in litiga-
tion briefs.
A final formal objection to enacted findings having the force of law might be
that finding facts is not within "the legislative power," as granted to Congress
by Article I of the Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment.9 6 Such an
argument would have to rely heavily on an unworkable ontological conception
of the fact-law divide,9 7 one not likely shared by the Framers of the Constitu-
tion. In at least one conspicuous place, the Second Amendment, the Framers
embedded an assertion of fact in a legislative document, presumably intending
it to have some effect in law. The Amendment's preamble states: "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State."98 That
statement is, unavoidably in an ontological sense, an assertion of fact-a claim
about something that could be, or not be, true in the world. One might believe
that the assertion was true in 1789 but no longer true today, that it was not true
in 1789 but is true today, that it was never true, or that it was and remains true.
92. See Devins, supra note 44, at 1169 ("Supreme Court decisionmaking treats the line separating
law from fact as consequential, often outcome-determinative.").
93. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932) ("In
cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the judicial power of the United States necessarily
extends to the independent determination of all questions, both of fact and law, necessary to the
performance of that supreme function.").
94. Bruce L. Ackerman, The Conclusive Presumption S/uffleu 125 U. PA. L. Riiv. 761, 784-86
(1977).
95. E.g., Carhart, 550 U.S. at 165-66.
96. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, A Comment on Congressional Enforcement, 32 INo. L. Riiv. 193,
207 (1998) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to make laws, "not an
exceptional ability to find facts").
97. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. 11.
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That the statement may not be scientifically falsifiable does not deprive it of an
essentially factual character any more than that any number of contemporary
congressional findings may not be subject to empirical demonstration and yet
remain assertions of fact."
To show that the Framers embedded an assertion of fact in a legislative
instrument falls short of showing that the Framers intended the assertion to have
legal effect. But in debating the role of the Second Amendment's preamble in
Heller, all nine Justices agreed that the preamble should be given some legal
effect, which undermines any claim that factual assertions are incapable of
being enacted into law. Relying on an eighteenth-century English precedent,
Justice Scalia's majority opinion argued that the preamble should play a con-
firmatory or ambiguity-breaking role but that it should not be permitted to alter
the scope of the operative provision.'" This holding relegates the prologue's
finding of fact to an inferior status compared to the operative section but
squarely includes the factual assertion as a working part of the constitutional
provision. The Justices in the majority in Heller surely would not join an
opinion that admitted that the Second Amendment granted an individual right to
bear arms in 1789 but that the passage of years had eroded the validity of the
factual predicate and hence the operation of the Amendment. Justice Stevens's
dissenting opinion accused the majority of violating the principle that every
clause in a statute must be given effect,'o' which even more strongly accords
the factual assertion the dignity of operative law. There is no originalist reason
to exclude embedding factual assertions in law from a formal conception of the
legislative power.
If enacted congressional findings become part of the statute and bear the
force of law, the formal case for according enacted findings a higher level of
deference than unenacted ones becomes clear. If a factual assertion in a statute
would be sufficient to sustain the statute's constitutionality, then a reviewing
court would need to invalidate the factual predicate itself in order to invalidate
the statute. That is not conceptually difficult as a formal matter. It simply
requires specifying the level of deference owed to legally enacted facts-
perhaps something akin to the presumption of constitutionality that attends
every statute' 2-and deciding whether a fact found by Congress is sufficiently
99. See infra section IV.A. I distinguish here between facts that can be subjected to falsification in a
Popperian sense, see generally KAR. POIER. THEi Lx;ac or ScniTInc DiscovERY (1959), and assertions
that cannot be falsified and yet describe things that could be true or untrue in the world.
100. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,577-78 (2008) (citing Copeman v. Gallant, (1716)
24 Eng. Rep. 404 (Ch.): I P. Wms. 314).
101. Id. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (-The preamble thus both sets forth the object of the
Amendment and informs the meaning of the remainder of its text. Such text should not be treated as
mere surplusage. for '[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be
without effect."' (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 174 (1803))).
102. E.g., United States v. Morrison. 529 U.S. 598. 607 (2000) (-Due respect for the decisions of a
coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a
plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.").
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robust given contending sources of evidence. Unenacted findings, which clearly
do not have the force of law, merit no presumption of regularity or correctness.
III. FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The previous section examined the likely formalist reasons for disregarding
the enactedness-unenactedness distinction on questions of statutory constitution-
ality and found them lacking. But formalist conceptions probably do not drive
the status quo in Congress or the courts (which, as shown in section I.B, is to
place no greater weight on enacted findings than on unenacted ones). Although
objections to the use of legislative history on matters of statutory interpretation
are often styled as formalist, 0 3 functional and pragmatic arguments arguably
play a more significant role.'0 Textualists argue that legislative history fails to
reflect the true view of Congress as a whole, 05 that it empowers judges to "pick
their friends out of the crowd,"'" that it increases costs of litigation and legal
counseling,' 0 7 and that it creates perverse incentives to paper the legislative
record with favored characterizations of the bill rather than fighting to enact
one's views in the statute itself. 0 8 By the same token, the absence of complaints
on either side of the ideological spectrum about reliance on unenacted findings
during constitutional review probably reflects shared functionalist assumptions
about the reasons that congressional findings matter for purposes of constitu-
tional review.
This Part examines three leading arguments about why congressional findings
of fact should matter to constitutional review: (1) Congress has a comparative
103. See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cudllar, Eannarking Eannarking, 49 HARV. J. ON Liarls. 249, 283
(2012) (describing Justice Scalia's objection to the interpretive use of legislative history as -formalist"):
Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-inessiness Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 87 NoTrE DAmi L.
Rriv. 1465, 1507-08 (2012) (same).
104. See John F. Manning, The New Purposivismn, 2011 Sui. Cr. Ri:v. 113, 123-24 (observing that
"new textualists object to the use of legislative history as a source of meaning on pragmatic and
formalist grounds").
105. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 620 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that legislative history "does not necessarily say anything about what Congress as a
whole thought").
106. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Tern, 68 IowA L. Riv. 195, 214 (1983) (attributing the quote "looking over a crowd and picking
out your friends" to Judge Harold Leventhal).
107. SCArIA, supra note 2, at 36-37: Kenneth W. Starr. Observations About the Use of Legislative
History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371. 377.
108. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAr . L. Ruiv. 1287, 1294 (2010) (assert-
ing that legislative committees "generate legislative history strategically at the behest of client interest
groups"). The Supreme Court has stated:
[J]udicial reliance on legislative materials like committee reports. which are not themselves
subject to the requirements of Article 1, may give unrepresentative committee members-or.
worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists-both the power and the incentive to attempt
strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable to achieve
through the statutory text.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546. 568 (2005).
2014]1 659
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
advantage in finding facts; (2) Congress's findings of fact reveal whether
Congress has an impermissible motive; and (3) findings of fact reveal that
Congress has engaged in a robust, plenary, and democracy-enhancing delibera-
tive process. Each of these functional perspectives on congressional findings has
implications for the relevance of the enactedness line.
A. RELIABILITY
Why should a court ever defer to a factual finding of Congress when
reviewing the constitutionality of a statute? The leading answer, asserted by
judges on both sides of the ideological spectrum, is that Congress has fact-
finding capabilities that exceed those of the courts. Thus, for example, Justice
Souter asserted in Morrison that Congress's "institutional capacity for gathering
evidence and taking testimony far exceeds" that of the Supreme Court.' 09 In
Garrett, Justice Breyer argued that "[u]nlike courts, Congress can readily gather
facts from across the Nation, assess the magnitude of a problem, and more
easily find an appropriate remedy.""o In Bartnicki, it was the conservatives, led
by Justice Rehnquist in dissent, arguing that "as an institution, Congress is far
better equipped than the judiciary to evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing
upon complex issues.""' That Congress has an institutional advantage on broad
fact-finding is a point of pan-ideological consensus.
If Congress's findings of fact are to receive deference because of their
comparative reliability, then the question of whether greater deference should be
accorded to facts asserted in a statute than to those asserted only in legislative
history should depend on whether enacted factual assertions are, on average,
more reliable than unenacted factual assertions. The case for enhanced reliabil-
ity depends on the presence of some screen in the legislative process that strains
out less reliable factual assertions as they make their way from legislative
history (that is, hearings and committee reports) to the text of an act. It is
doubtful whether any such screen exists and hence doubtful whether enacted
findings are on average more reliable than unenacted ones.
Set aside for the moment the question of whether Congress, as a body,
actually enjoys a comparative advantage in the production of knowledge through
fact-finding, a question considered in section IV.A below.1 2 If Congress does
109. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
I10. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 384 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 550 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Walters v.
Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 n.12 (1985) ("When Congress makes findings on
essentially factual issues such as these, those findings are of course entitled to a great deal of deference,
inasmuch as Congress is an institution better equipped to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data
bearing on such an issue.").
112. On this question, there is nothing close to a consensus. Compare John 0. McGinnis & Charles
W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. CoMMirNT. 69, 94 (2008) (arguing that "the assumption
that Congress is a superior fact-finding body overlooks the incentives of the individuals who compose
it"). with Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and En viromnental Policy, 1999 U. l.i. L. Ri. 18 1,
221 (arguing that "[tihe adversarial process embodied in most congressional decisionmaking does
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have such an advantage, it is achieved primarily at the investigatory stage of the
legislative process when Congress holds hearings, subpoenas documents and
witnesses, and otherwise collects information. Those investigatory processes
produce the hearing transcripts and committee reports that form the basis for the
unenacted findings of fact that show up in judicial decisions. The further
legislative processes that produce the final text of an enacted statute, such as
floor amendments and drafting in House-Senate conferences, are not principally
fact-finding processes and are therefore unlikely to enhance the reliability of
congressional assertions of fact." 3 For example, Neal Devins has shown that
Congress paid little attention to constitutional questions during the legislative
process leading to the enactment of the ACA, but Department of Justice lawyers
culled eight statutory findings of fact out of the legislative record in order to
buttress the statute's constitutionality.' '4 The culling of the eight findings by
congressional or Justice Department lawyers with an eye to litigation adds little
to the reliability of the findings.
This is not to say that the process of winnowing factual assertions from the
many in the legislative record to the few in a statutory text has no implication
for the reliability of the statutory findings. During negotiations over the ultimate
text of a statute, congressional players may raise doubts about the accuracy of
factual assertions in the legislative record. For example, if there is conflicting
evidence in the House and Senate records,"" the conference reconciliation
process may result in the assertion of facts on which there is consensus in the
records of both houses. Or the ultimate bill's draftspersons may play some role
in testing the robustness of assertions in the legislative record, for example, by
selecting for inclusion in the statutory text evidence produced by sources
considered most reliable by the legislative coalition in favor of the act.
Despite these qualifications, the principal point remains a high degree of
skepticism that the transition from legislative history to statute produces, on
average, significantly more reliable factual assertions. To the extent that argu-
ments for deference depend on a view that Congress has a comparative advan-
tage over courts in fact-finding, this observation explains the indifference to the
enactedness line when it comes to questions of constitutionality.
But this assumes that comparative reliability is the only reason for deferring
to congressional fact-finding. Part IV of this Article challenges the view that
Congress's comparative advantage in fact-finding should animate judicial defer-
provide generally reliable quality control on Congress's scientific fact-finding"). See generally Devins,
supra note 44, at 1178-79 (outlining traditional arguments that Congress has a comparative advantage
in fact-finding).
113. See generally Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. Riv. 575 (2002).
114. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Judicial Review: Lessons fron the Affordable
Care Act, 106 Nw. U. L. Riiv. 1821. 1837 & n.64 (2012).
115. See, e.g., Julius Cohen, Towards Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YAi t L.J. 886, 890-91 (1950)
(reporting a large number of inconsistent assertions of fact in the legislative records of the Taft-Hartley
Act).
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ence to congressional assertions of fact and offers a different ground for
deference-one that makes the enactedness-unenactedness line again impor-
tant. And there are other reasons why courts might defer to congressional
findings of fact, such as scrutinizing legislative motivation and promoting
deliberative democracy, which have their own implications for the importance
of the enactedness-unenactedness line.
B. MOTIVATION
Another reason that congressional findings of fact might count in constitu-
tional review is that Congress's findings reveal Congress's motivations for
adopting the statute in question. To the extent that congressional motivation or
purpose plays an important role in constitutional analysis,"'6 factual findings by
Congress may reveal Congress's reasons for adopting the statute and hence
facilitate judicial review.' 17 If the search for motives is an important reason for
consulting congressional fact-finding, then the line between enacted and unen-
acted findings might be of little importance if enacted and unenacted facts are
equally capable of evidencing congressional motivation. The success of such a
position, however, depends upon the soundness of three contestable and non-
generalizable assumptions: first, that congressional motivation is important to
constitutional analysis; second, that findings contained in legislative history
reliably reveal the motivations of Congress as a whole; and third, that what
counts is Congress's subjective motivations as opposed to its stated reasons.
For most of the United States' constitutional history, judges strictly limited
inquiry into legislative motivation. In the last several decades, they have begun
to inquire considerably more into legislative motivation.'" Assuming that
inquiry into legislative motivation is now a significant part of constitutional
analysis-not just in obvious areas like gender or religious classifications where
legislative motivation has long been at issue"9 but also in areas like the
Commerce Clause where the Supreme Court's landmark opinions have denied
the relevance of legislative motivation' 20-then perhaps factual findings play an
important role because of what they show about Congress's motivation. Find-
ings that suggest that Congress acted for permissible reasons support constitution-
ality, whereas those that suggest animus toward protected classes, stigmatizing
stereotypes, viewpoint discrimination, or efforts to aggrandize Congress's role
116. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIn. L. Rvv. 297, 312-13
(1997); Paul Brest, Reflections on Motive Review, 15 SAN Dumo L. Riv. 1141, 1141-42 (1978); Caleb
Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rviv. 1784, 1879-82 (2008).
117. See, e.g., Seinfeld, supra note 35. at 1324-27.
118. Nelson, supra note 116, at 1879: see also David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges. Legislative
Purpose, and the Commerce Clause. 92 lowA L. Rviv. 41, 90-102 (2006) (arguing that a requirement of
appropriate legislative purpose has crept into the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
119. JOHN HAfr Ei.y DisMoCRACY AND DISTRust A THEORY OF JUI)ICIAi. Rivi:w 145-46 (1980)
(discussing the role of motivation in Equal Protection analysis).
120. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964) (rejecting a claim that
Congress's true motivation in passing a civil rights statute was moral rather than commercial).
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beyond its enumerated powers militate against constitutionality.
If this is all so, it raises the question of whether unenacted findings provide as
much evidence of congressional motivation as enacted findings. Arguably, the
enactedness line should hold here as much as it does for purposes of statutory
interpretation. If a stray characterization of a statutory provision in a committee
report does not count-or counts only weakly-as evidence of congressional
purpose during the course of statutory interpretation, then why should a stray
finding of fact in a committee report count any more strongly as evidence of
congressional purpose for purposes of constitutional analysis? If there is merit
to the functionalist claims of textualists that legislative "losers" often sneak into
legislative history positions they are unable forthrightly to secure in the bill,12 1
then a good portion of unenacted findings in committee reports or other
legislative history will be nothing but efforts by political minorities not represent-
ing the dominant motivations in Congress to paper the record with their
preferred characterizations of the bill. Giving weight to these stealth assertions
as the purpose of Congress would erroneously attribute minority motivation to
the majority.
This raises the frequently debated question of whether the "objective" or
"subjective" purposes of Congress should predominate in constitutional re-
view.' 22 As a matter of positive law, the answer is context specific; however, in
many fields of law, the Supreme Court has stressed that to the extent that
purposivist analysis is relevant to constitutionality, it is the objective purpose-
the vantage point of the ubiquitous "reasonable observer"-that counts.' 2 3 To
the extent that courts stress objective rather than subjective purpose, enacted
findings may be far more probative of congressional purpose than unenacted
ones because findings enacted in a statute express the final and formal perspec-
tive of Congress as a whole. For example, in the Establishment Clause context,
where motive is explicitly part of the legal test,' 24 at least one court has held
that factual findings enacted by Congress in a public law carry significantly
121. In re Sinclair. 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (asserting that legislative history is "losers'
history" because losers in legislative battles follow the motto, -[i]f you can't get your proposal into the
bill, at least write the legislative history to make it look as if you'd prevailed").
I 22. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YAHi L.J. 1205, 1217-21 (1970); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: Tie Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine. 63 U. CHI. L. Riv. 413, 426 n.40 (1996): Andrew
Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. Rniv. 87, 117 (2002): Richard H. Pildes. Why Riglts Are Not
Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism. 27 J. LiGAl S-rul. 725, 730-31
(1998): Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause. 84 MICH. L. Riv. 1091, 1143 (1986): Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendmment's
Purpose. 53 STAN. L. Rniv. 767, 793-94 (2001): Seinfeld. supra note 35. at 1301-03.
123. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844. 862 (2005) (holding that the purpose inquiry
does not call for "any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter's heart of hearts" but that "[tlhe eyes that look
to purpose belong to an 'objective observer,' one who takes account of the traditional external signs that
show up in the 'text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute.' or comparable official act"
(quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290. 308 (2000)).
124. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (holding that "the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose").
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greater weight in uncovering congressional purpose than do assertions of fact or
purpose in legislative history.12 5 Assertions of fact contained in a statute more
powerfully express the public motivations and purposes of Congress than those
buried in legislative history.12 6
To sum up, in order to believe that the line between enacted and unenacted
congressional findings is unimportant, one has to credit each of the following
propositions: (1) the motivation of Congress is important to constitutional
analysis; (2) findings contained in committee reports or other legislative history
reliably reveal the motivations of a sufficient quorum of members of Congress
and are not likely to be mere losers' histories; and (3) Congress's subjective
motivations captured through glimpses into its thought processes count more
than the objective explanations offered in findings of fact embedded in a statute.
Each of these propositions is both contestable and nongeneralizable, which
renders the ostensible conclusion-that the enactment line is unimportant-
fragile as well.
C. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS REINFORCEMENT
A third functional argument about the role of legislative findings in constitu-
tional analysis relates to the courts' role in stimulating robust and democracy-
enhancing legislative processes-what has been called "due process of
lawmaking." 2 7 Findings of fact may be less important for their truth or
reliability than as evidence that Congress has undergone a careful and searching
inquiry into the relevant factual predicates to the statute.' 28 Philip Frickey has
argued that "the approach taken in Lopez," requiring Congress to make findings
of fact in order to sustain expansive assertions of Commerce Clause power,
125. See Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1207-10 (S.D. Cal. 2008), rev d, 629
F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2011). In Trunk, the district court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a
congressional acquisition of a veteran's memorial with a conspicuous Latin cross. Id. Plaintiffs argued
that the legislative history revealed a predominantly religious motivation for the acquisition. Id. The
district court rejected this argument, largely on the grounds that Congress's findings of fact in the public
law evidenced a secular purpose. Id. In response to plaintiffs' arguments that the findings of fact were
pretextual, Judge Burns stressed that the "objective evidence" about the "motives or purposes of
Congress as a whole" should be dispositive and rejected plaintiffs' "cynical assumption that a
commanding majority of the House of Representatives and the entire U.S. Senate didn't mean what
they said." Id. at 1208-09. In reversing, the Court of Appeals agreed that Congress's purpose was not
impermissible but held that the primary effect of the cross was to advance religion. 629 F.3d at 1102.
126. Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 9, at 158-59 (arguing that "findings also are themselves a form
of legislative record that is perhaps more reliable than witnesses' or legislators' assertions about the
state of the world").
127. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of L.awmaking, 55 Ni:u. L. Rjiv. 197, 251-55 (1976); see also
WIu.tAM N. ESKRHtXil, JR. & PHILIw P. FRICKEY. CASES AND MATRIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION o PunIuC Po.tcy 485-506 (2d ed. 1995): Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Ruiv. 269, 269 (1975).
128. Characterizing the famous footnote 4 in Carolene Products, Jack Balkin suggests that the test
of the reasonableness of socioeconomic legislation "is whether Congress has held hearings, gathered
evidence, made detailed findings of fact-in short, whether there are indicia of a sound and considered
judgment by the elected representatives of the people based upon reliable scientific information."
J. M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. Ruiv. 275. 288 (1989).
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"may be a plausible technique to encourage appropriate congressional proce-
dures and consideration."12 1
If congressional fact-finding supports constitutionality because it shows whole-
some legislative process, then should it matter whether the findings make their
way into the statute or only show up in legislative history? The answer tracks
closely with the usual process-based concerns over the use of legislative history
to interpret statutes. According significant weight to facts asserted in committee
reports and other legislative history encourages legislative factions to focus
their energies on embedding preferred factual assertions in legislative history
instead of battling to build the coalitions necessary to enact their views into law.
It may thus perpetuate the same culture of chicanery, evasion, and faux legisla-
tion that has animated the backlash against the use of legislative history for
interpretation. 130
Consider, for example, an only partially hypothetical legislative backdrop to
the ultimately dispositive issue on the individual mandate in the ACA-whether
it could be fairly characterized as a tax.' 3 ' Assume two principal factions within
the Democratic Party, each favoring the individual mandate, but each anxious to
characterize it in a particular way in order to play to favored constituencies. One
faction is desperate to avoid any characterization of the mandate as a tax
because of potential voter backlash and hence promotes the mandate solely as a
regulatory measure to achieve universal coverage and improve healthcare. This
faction would rather see the mandate invalidated as outside of the commerce
power than wear the tax albatross ultimately hung by Chief Justice Roberts. 132
The other faction wants to secure a durable and constitutionally impervious
statutory framework for an individual mandate and is not shy about characteriz-
ing the mandate as a tax penalty on shirkers and healthcare free riders.' 33
Requiring that any findings used to assess constitutional validity be enacted
into law prevents these two factions from playing a dubious game of asserting
competing facts in legislative history, insisting to political constituencies that
their version of the factual predicate is the true one, and then allowing Justice
Department lawyers defending the statute to pick and choose factual predicates
129. Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication,
and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASi W. Rnis. L. Ri v. 695, 697 (1996); see also Lawrence Lessig,
Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sui. CT. Riv. 125, 207 (evaluating an explanation
of Lopez as imposing the requirement that Congress make a -[c]lear statement of economic effect" in
order to show that Congress considered the relevant factual predicate); Note, Deference to Legislative
Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases After Turner Broadcasting, Ill HARv. L. Riv. 2312,
2327-28(1998).
130. See Manning, supra note 108, at 1294.
131. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
132. See Devins, supra note 114, at 1829 (noting that "recognizing the political costs of raising
taxes, Democratic lawmakers (and the Obama White House) *absolutely reject[edl' efforts to character-
ize the individual mandate as a tax" (quoting Robert Pear, Changing Stance, Administration Now
Defends Insurance Mandate as a Tax, N.Y. TIMlis, July 18, 2010, at A 14).
133. In fact, the Obama Administration eventually came around to characterizing the individual
mandate as a tax. See Pear, supra note 132.
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to suit the prevailing winds in court-providing cover and plausible deniability
for Members of Congress who voted for the bill. Insisting that only enacted
facts count would disallow these shadow legislative games and force Congress
to deliberate and decide on the factual predicates by which the statute stands or
falls.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL FACT-FINDING RECONSIDERED
The preceding Part's exploration of leading functional explanations for reli-
ance on congressional fact-finding in constitutional adjudication concluded
indecisively. Reliability considerations suggest the relative unimportance of
enactedness, whereas motivation and process considerations suggest some de-
gree of importance. This Part proposes a somewhat different understanding of
congressional fact-finding-one that understands assertions of fact as deeply
normative. Congressional findings often commingle "is" and "ought" in ways
that make it impossible to separate the positive from the normative. The
normative content of legislative findings has implications for the line between
enacted and unenacted. Because the enactment of norms lies at the heart of the
legislative power, those norms deserve judicial respect only when they are duly
enacted as law.
A. DOES CONGRESS REALLY FIND FACTS?
Two questions posed earlier in this Article but not squarely answered are
(1) what it means for Congress to find facts and (2) whether Congress has any
comparative advantage over other organs of government, such as courts, the
Executive Branch, or administrative agencies, in finding facts. To put these
questions in perspective, start with the distinction between adjudicative facts
and legislative facts proposed by Kenneth Culp Davis in the middle of the
twentieth century and since employed canonically to distinguish between two
varieties of fact-finding.134 Adjudicative facts concern the specific circum-
stances of parties in an adversarial proceeding, whereas legislative facts involve
more general and aggregate conclusions.' 35 Apart from impeachment, Congress
does not engage in adjudicative fact-finding. Its comparative advantage, if any,
lies in finding general, aggregate, or statistical facts.
As discussed in section II.B, there is a pan-ideological consensus on the
Supreme Court that Congress has a comparative advantage over courts in
134. KiNNITH Cui.t DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVii LAw TREATIsi § 15.03 (1958); Kenneth Culp Davis, An
Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L. Rviv. 364, 365-66 (1942):
Davis, supra note 12, at 549: see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (Harlan, J..
dissenting) ("To the extent 'legislative facts' are relevant to a judicial determination. Congress is well
equipped to investigate them, and such determinations are of course entitled to due respect."):
Dean Alfange, Jr., The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law. 114 U. PA. L. Ruiv. 637.
640(1966).
135. Davis. supra note 12. at 549.
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finding legislative facts because of the vastness of the data involved.' 3" But this
sort of "wisdom of the crowds" assumption flies in the face of modern social
science, which privileges expertise, peer-reviewed technique, and methodologi-
cal rigor in validating statistical or empirical claims.'" Take, for example, one
of the statutory findings in the ACA that the statute would shift $43 billion in
uncompensated care to private health insurers. Suppose an economist as-
serted that claim in an expert report during an adjudicatory proceeding and the
expert was asked on cross-examination to divulge the basis for her empirical
claim. If the expert answered that she had relied on the $43 billion figure
because it was believed to be true by a majority of the members of the House of
Representative and the Senate, her testimony would surely fail the strictures of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,' 3 which essentially require that an
expert's "testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods."I 4 0 n
order to admit the testimony, the court would demand evidence that the econo-
mist had performed her calculations using rigorous methods subject to testing,
peer review, error rates, and acceptability in the relevant scientific commu-
nity.141 Statistical and empirical training is not a necessary qualification to hold
congressional office, nor are individual members of Congress likely to engage
in any sort of empirical or statistical computations before asserting figures like
$43 billion.
Congress does have institutional resources such as the Congressional Budget
Office and the Congressional Research Service available to conduct statistical
or empirical studies.14 2 But to the extent that these are the institutional capa-
bilities thought to provide Congress its comparative advantage in finding legisla-
tive facts, there is a mismatch between perception and the reality of modern
congressional fact-finding.14 3 Empirical facts found in modern statutes or legisla-
tive history usually come not from congressional research arms but from
136. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) ('"We owe Congress' findings
deference in part because the institution Is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate
the vast amounts of data bearing upon' legislative questions." (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC.
512 U.S. 622, 665-66 (1994))): Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U. CHi. L.
Riv. 19, 38 (1969) (i[The Court ... lacks machinery for gathering the wide range of facts and opinions
that should inform the judgment of a prime policymaker.").
137. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993) (discussing four factors
relevant to determining the reliability of a particular scientific theory or technique as evidence in
litigation-testing. peer review, error rates, and acceptability in the relevant scientific community).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(F) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
139. 509 U.S. at 593-94.
140. Fin. R. Evin. 702(c).
141. See Daubert. 509 U.S. at 593-94: see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. 526 U.S. 137. 141
(1999).
142. Devins. supra note 44, at 1179-80 (describing institutional resources available to Congress to
conduct fact-finding).
143. Id. at 1182 (arguing that Congress lacks the necessary incentives to take advantage of its
fact-finding powers): see also Matthew C. Stephenson. Information Acquisition and Institutional
Design. 124 HARv. L. Riuv. 1422, 1427-32 (2011) (arguing that political institutions often lack sufficient
incentives to gather information).
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Executive Branch agencies, independent agencies, nonprofit organizations, or
academic researchers.
For example, most or all of the statistical findings in the ACA were derived
from extracongressional research. Projections about future increases in health-
care spending were made by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
Office of the Actuary, National Health Expenditure Projections,'" 4 an Executive
Branch agency within the Department of Health and Human Services. The
estimate that the national economy loses up to $207 billion a year because of
the poorer health and shorter lifespan of the uninsured was drawn from a report
by the New America Foundation.145 The estimate that $43 billion in uncompen-
sated care is shifted to private health insurers was made by Families USA, a
nonprofit, consumer healthcare-advocacy organization.146 The finding that 62%
of all personal bankruptcies were caused by illness or medical bills originated in
a study published in the American Journal of Medicine.14 7 When Congress
"found" these facts, it found them fully formed in policy briefings or academic
literature. Congress itself contributed nothing to their formation.
The ACA is characteristic of modern federal statutes. Findings asserted by
Congress are generally not generated by Congress itself but appropriated from
other sources. It is unsurprising that Congress routinely outsources its fact-
finding function because Congress routinely outsources much of its bill-writing
function to lobbyists.148 The frequently assumed vision of Congress generating
social knowledge based on the expertise and experience of its diverse member-
ship has little relation to reality. At most, Congress plays a validating role,
accepting or rejecting the assertions of outside constituencies in order to
advance a legislative agenda.
This does not have to be a criticism of Congress. There is nothing inherently
wrong with a legislative body appropriating information created by interest
groups.149 But recognizing that congressional findings of fact are not generally
the product of independent congressional investigation changes the basis for the
claim that courts should defer to congressional findings. There are glimmers of
such a recognition in some Supreme Court decisions. In Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, the majority acknowledged-over a vigorous dissent-that
144. 156 CoN(. Ric. S1986 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 2010) (reporting that "[niational health spending is
projected to increase from $2,500,000,000,000, or 17.6 percent of the economy, in 2009 to
$4,700,000,000,000 in 2019" based on a report by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services).
145. 156 CON6. Risc. E506 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman).
146. 155 CoNG. Risc. 30,918 (2009) (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("A Kaiser Family Foundation
study dissected the Families USA numbers and estimated that the total amount of uncompensated care
shifted to private insurers was closer to $11 billion, making the so-called hidden tax around $200 for a
family, compared to the $1,100 that Families USA said.").
147. 156 CoN;. Ric. S1985 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 2010) (citing David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical
Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. Mim. 741 (2009)).
148. Nourse & Schacter. supra note 113, at 583-88 (describing the significant role that lobbyists
play in drafting federal legislation).
149. But see McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 112. at 94-95 (discussing public-choice implications
of congressional fact-finding).
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many of Congress's findings were simply endorsements of factual assertions
presented by interested third parties.150 Congress itself had not produced the
information embedded in the statutory- and legislative-history findings any
more than a judge or jury in an adversarial system produces the factual
information it ultimately finds. The Court nonetheless justified deference to
Congress's findings, asserting that "[t]he Constitution gives to Congress the role
of weighing conflicting evidence in the legislative process." 15,
This assertion marks a subtle shift from the conventional conception of
Congress as a skilled and diversified production facility for social knowledge to
a view of Congress as the branch of government constitutionally deputized to
validate competing third-party assertions of social facts. It shifts the basis for
deference from reliability to legitimacy. In so doing, it begs the question of why
findings of social facts are more democratically legitimate when articulated by
Congress than by the courts.
B. THE NORMATIVE COMPONENT OF CONGRESSIONAL FACT-FINDING
To explain why Congress has the strongest claims to political legitimacy in
finding social facts, it is necessary to return to the illusory divide between law
and fact discussed earlier-to the observation that the line between fact and law
is not ontological or epistemological but institutional and practical. 5 2 If legis-
lative facts could be validated or falsified through scientific methods and
Congress had no comparative advantage in producing the most accurate asser-
tions of fact, it would be difficult to understand why democratic theory would
require deferring to Congress's factual assertions. Deference would be due to
the institutions-legislative actors, executive departments, courts, administra-
tive agencies, blue ribbon commissions, private foundations or nonprofit organi-
zations, respected academics, supercomputers, etc.-that produced the most
reliable social facts. On the other hand, if legislative facts of the kind found by
Congress and contested on constitutional questions contain strongly normative
and objectively unverifiable elements, then the claim for deference carries
considerably more appeal. Congress's democratic function is to specify legal
and political norms. Hence, Congress's findings of facts with embedded norma-
tive content represent a form of lawmaking that courts and other branches of
government should not usurp.
As scholars have long recognized, congressional fact-finding entails a norma-
tive component.153 Even when making empirical or statistical assertions, factual
150. 520 U.S. 180, 199 (1997).
151. Id. The Court added that "much of the testimony, though offered by interested parties, was
supported by verifiable information and citation to independent sources." Id.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
153. See, e.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTIfUTIONAL FicroNS: A UNIwID THEORY O1: CONSTITUTIONAL
FACrs xiii (2008); David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Etnpiri-
cal Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. Riv. 541, 552 (1991); Allison Orr Larsen,
Con fronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. Riv. 1255. 1256-57 (2012) (discussing legislative
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findings by Congress often drip with normative content. "Ought" is almost
invariably intertwined with "is." Consider some examples.
In the Violence Against Women Act, Congress found that "crimes of violence
motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce,
by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in em-
ployment in interstate business, and from transacting with business[es]" in-
volved in interstate commerce.15 4 In essence, Congress asserted that violence
against women depresses interstate commerce and thus that Congress could
validly prohibit such violence in order to stimulate interstate commerce. Is that
assertion correct? One can certainly take that view, but it would be virtually
impossible to prove that the net effect of violence on women is positive or
negative in the sense of augmenting or diminishing interstate commerce. Traffick-
ing of women for prostitution might create a flourishing interstate sex market,
but it is prohibited by the Mann Act.15 1 Women fleeing abusive relationships
might cross state lines, patronizing hotels, restaurants, and gas stations, like
Thelma and Louise in the eponymous 1991 movie.' 56 Abuse victims might
move to other states to distance themselves from abusive relationships. Violence
against women might even create interstate markets for safe houses, abuse
hotlines, and self-help publications for victims of abuse.
Of course, none of these possibilities provides a normatively appealing
understanding of the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce.
And Congress can hardly have meant to stake the constitutionality of the statute
on an assertion that the gross domestic product would increase if men just
stopped mistreating women. Rather, the claim that violence against women
affects interstate commerce is best understood as a claim that women should be
allowed to participate in national economic life without fear of violence or
abuse. That is fundamentally a normative claim, one that represents an assertion
of moral and social values relating to opportunity and participation.
Or take the Family and Medical Leave Act's assertion that "it is important for
the development of children and the family unit that fathers and mothers be able
to participate in early childrearing and the care of family members who have
serious health conditions."' 57 Is that a fact? The claim belongs at least as much
to the world of normative assertion. Children with serious health conditions can
facts as related to policy-making functions); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by
Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YAEi L.J. 1535, 1551
(2000) (discussing the relevance of normative fact-finding to possible legislative enactments regarding
stare decisis): Suzanna Sherry. Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change. 2011 U. li.i.. L. Ri~v. 145,
146 (discussing "foundational facts" consisting of assumptions on which legal doctrine is based).
154. H.R. Rin. No. 103-711. at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2012) (prohibiting transporting women across state lines for immoral
purposes).
156. THiEL.MA & Louis: (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1991). Alas, in robbing banks and committing
various acts of mayhem and destruction. Thelma and Louise likely imposed a net negative effect on
interstate commerce.
157. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2) (2012).
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develop emotionally, cognitively, and physically without their parents staying
home, for example, if enrolled in pediatric day-treatment centers or attended
to by pediatric home-health aides or professional caretakers. Congress's asser-
tion is that parents who stay home to attend to sick children foster a socially
desirable form of child development and family-unit cohesion. Although
that claim may be normatively attractive, it cannot be falsified without specify-
ing the content of the socially desirable qualities that Congress seeks to
advance-an undertaking that relies on Congress's creation of the social norm.
Or consider the Senate Judiciary Committee's assertion in the Equal Access
Act's legislative history that "students below the college level are capable of
distinguishing between State-initiated, school-sponsored, or teacher-led reli-
gious speech on the one hand and student-initiated, student-led religious speech
on the other."' It is surely true that some students can differentiate activities
led by their teachers from those led by their peers, but equally clear that some
number of students will believe that the presence of a Bible-study club at school
reflects the school's endorsement of religion. The Committee's claim about
students only makes sense as an assertion that a sufficiently large percentage of
students will not be misled such that the presence of religious clubs will not
impair constitutional values. The validity of this claim turns not merely on an
objective assessment of secondary-student social cognition but on some implicit
conclusion about what society's tolerance level should be for students getting
the wrong impression. The Committee's claim is ultimately that the actual
levels are tolerable.
Even congressional findings that make statistical or empirical claims often
contain subsidiary normative or moral claims. Consider the ACA's statutory
finding that the individual mandate "is essential to creating effective health
insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are guaran-
teed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be
sold."'5 9 Although one might attempt to validate or falsify this assertion using
economic theory or empirical data, validation and falsification would depend
critically on a robust understanding of "improved." Would it be an improvement
if insurance markets produced less dispersion in the variance of coverage for
advantaged and disadvantaged insureds, even if the average quality of coverage
decreased? What if the variance decreased, average quality rose, but some
previously advantaged individuals received worse coverage than previously?
Would that count as an improvement? Although this finding has implications for
many subsidiary beliefs that could be tested using scientifically accepted meth-
ods, the overall assertion could not be validated or falsified without a specifica-
tion by Congress of what counts as an improvement-a question that necessarily
entails a normative, moral, or aesthetic judgment that would have to be supplied
by the person making the assertion, here Congress.
158. S. Rnair No. 98-357, at 35 (1984).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(1) (Supp. IV 2011).
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The same point could be made for any number of congressional assertions of
fact at issue in recent constitutional litigation: "foreign organizations that
engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any
contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct";160 "[a] moral,
medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice of performing a partial-
birth abortion .. . is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never medically
necessary and should be prohibited";' 6 ' "[m]any of the drugs included within
this subchapter have a useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary
to maintain the health and general welfare of the American people";' 62 and "the
Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency for such individuals."' 6 3 When Congress asserts such findings,
it is making claims about what should be as much as about what is. Even if
individual components of an assertion can be subjected to falsification or
validation tests, the assertion as a whole usually cannot.
To be sure, there still are times when Congress makes raw statistical or
empirical assertions-for example, the assertion that 176 million people had
health insurance coverage in 2009.' But deference should not be an important
issue with respect to such assertions. The data often are not in dispute, and if
they are, there is no reason to think that elected members of Congress are
comparatively advantaged in the production of statistical data.'6 5 The interest-
ing deference questions arise when Congress asserts the kind of "facts" riddled
with moral and normative judgment discussed -above. When courts defer to
these kinds of findings, they do so not merely because Congress is better at
finding them than the courts, in the sense that Congress gets closer to some
objective truth, but because the formulation of such facts involves the creation
of moral and social norms and hence the exercise of legislative power.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR ENACTEDNESS
The previous two sections have suggested a different understanding of Con-
gress's fact-finding role than that usually assumed in the academic literature and
160. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
162. 21 U.S.C. § 801(1) (2012). Dissenting in Raich, Justice Thomas asserted that the findings in the
Controlled Substances Act were "not so much findings of fact as assertions of power." 545 U.S. 1. 64
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). To the extent that he meant that the findings were not falsifiable
propositions, he was onto something. However, to the extent that Congress's findings asserted moral
facts about what is "useful and legitimate," id. at 24 (majority opinion), it is unclear why this should be
regarded as a power grab rather than a performance of the legislative function. This is not to say that the
findings should necessarily have been sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of the Act.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2006).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(D) (Supp. IV 2011).
165. Statistical data concerning the incidence of medical-insurance coverage are tracked by the U.S.
Census Bureau. See generally CARMEN DtiNAvAs-WALT, BlERNADITi: D. PRocroR & JESSICA C. SMITH,
U.S. CINsus BUREAU, INCoME. PovERTY, AND HIAITH INSURANCE COVIERAGE IN THE UNITi STATis: 2011
(2012). available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf.
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judicial decisions. If deference is owed to Congress's findings, it is not because
they are more reliable than others but because they make normative assertions
of the kind that Congress has been elected to make. These findings are not law
in the Austinian sense of effectuating a command,' 66 but neither are they
falsifiable assertions whose predictive validity is a function of the reliability of
the institution asserting them. To call them mixed questions of fact and law
would confuse them with a different adjudicatory phenomenon,'"6 7 but they are
characterized by such an inextricable intertwining of positive and normative
assertions that efforts to disentangle the two would be futile.
What implications do these characteristics of modern congressional fact-
finding hold for the significance of the enactedness-unenactedness line? In a
formal sense, this understanding of congressional fact-finding bolsters a point
previously made-that enacted facts properly belong to the domain of law
and, as such, demand the full dignity accorded by the courts to acts of the
legislature. Just as statutes are presumed valid,' 6 8 so too normative facts as-
serted by Congress should be accorded a presumption of validity. Courts should
treat Congress's intertwined assertions of how the world is and should be with
great seriousness, reserving rejection of the statutory predicate for circum-
stances where acceptance of the predicate would compromise constitutional
values.
Correspondingly, unenacted findings should be entitled to no more weight in
constitutional analysis than they are in interpretive analysis, where legislative
history is nearly uniformly understood to have less importance in ascertaining
the meaning of a statute than provisions enacted into law. For example, the
views of a member of Congress who has been unable to advance her normative
understanding on state treatment of the disabled from a committee report to
the statutory text deserve no greater weight on constitutional analysis than they
do on interpretation. If bicameralism and presentment guarantee that only
norms with supermajoritarian acceptance make their way into law,' 6 9 then
normatively laden findings should run those gauntlets just like any other
statutory provision.
If all of this seems too formalistic, there is also an important functional
reason to stress the enactedness line as to normative congressional fact-finding.
By asserting the facts foundational to a statute, Congress narrows the range of
possible bases upon which the statute might be constitutional and thus facilitates
judicial review. According some measure of deference to the facts asserted
incentivizes Congress to make findings in the first place. Deference to enacted
166. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE 01: JURISPRUDIENCl: DiTI:RMINIle I (David Campbell & Philip Thomas
eds., 1998).
167. See The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. RlIv. 135, 317 (1996).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).
169. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Majority and Supermajority Rules: Three
Views of the Capitol, 85 Taix. L. Riiv. 1115, 1116 (2007) (discussing ways in which bicameralism and
presentment requirements operate as supermajoritarian rules).
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facts is the quid pro quo for Congress's help in narrowing the range of
possibilities for judicial consideration.
To specify this claim more fully, observe that the constitutionality of a statute
often turns on the interaction between different possible states of affairs in the
world. A statute regulating violence against women, channels provided by
cable-television companies, Internet pornography, or state accommodations for
the disabled might be constitutional or unconstitutional depending on whether
conditions X, Y, or Z occur or do not occur. For purposes of rational basis
review, a reviewing court must uphold the statute if "there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classifica-
tion." 17 0 For purposes of heightened modes of judicial review, there may still be
a variety of different factual predicates that would support constitutionality and
others that would not. Because the courts do not require Congress to affirma-
tively specify the factual predicate, "' in order to invalidate a statute, courts
have to rule out the existence of the factual predicates that would have sup-
ported the statute's constitutionality. Because the factual predicates are often
normatively loaded-more moral or social characterizations of the world than
objective facts-in order to strike down a statute, courts must rule out the
possibility that Congress could validly have placed a number of different
normative glosses on the world. This is awkward business for judges because it
involves not only inquiring into empirical propositions (that is, do battered
women forgo participation in interstate commerce?) but also normative ones
(that is, could Congress validly conclude that violence against women has
morally troubling implications for the way in which interstate commerce un-
folds?) and doing so across the range of possible occurrences. 72
When Congress stakes the constitutionality of a statute on enacted findings,
it facilitates the process of judicial review by narrowing the range of possible
occurrences for consideration. It also exposes itself to a vulnerability. By
focusing on the particular occurrences that it claims support constitutionality,
Congress implicitly excludes other occurrences that might have supported
constitutionality. This can be costly. Recall Justice Scalia's objection in Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius that Congress identified
the regulation of interstate healthcare markets, not taxing healthcare shirkers, as
the constitutional basis for the ACA. 7 If Congress points to X, the courts may
forgo looking to Y, even though Y might have provided an arguable basis for
constitutionality. Or even worse, the courts may conclude that the factual
170. Armour v. City of Indianapolis. 132 S. Ct. 2073. 2080 (2012) (quoting FCC v. Beach
Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307. 313 (1993)).
171. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
172. See Peggy C. Davis. "There is a Book Out...": An Analysis of Judicial AbsorInion of
Legislative Facts. 100 HARv. L. Ri:v. 1539, 1542 (1987) (arguing that "legal enshrinement [of legislative
facts] is casual and unselfconscious, and their assessment often superficial and skewed by litigation
imbalances").
173. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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predicate offered by Congress demonstrates the statute's unconstitutionality if it
reveals an inadmissible motivation for the statute.17 4
If nothing else, deference to findings may be a mechanism for courts to
incentivize Congress to facilitate judicial review by narrowing the range of
possible occurrences supporting constitutionality. In that case, enactment of the
factual predicates is important. The mechanism of occurrence-narrowing is
commitment by Congress to a particular characterization of the world as the
statutory predicate. If Congress creates a collage of competing factual character-
izations in the legislative record and commits to none of them in the statute,
thus preserving flexibility to pick and choose during litigation, it has not
significantly narrowed the range of occurrences for judicial review and should
not expect any reward from the courts.17 5 Enacted findings have the potential of
serving as congressional precommitment mechanisms that could facilitate, clarify,
and sharpen the course of judicial review.176 If so, Congress should expect a
quid pro quo for making them-some degree of judicial deference.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF OBSERVING THE ENACTEDNESS LINE
This Article has presented a case for making the line between enacted and
unenacted legislative findings of fact as important for constitutionality as it is
for statutory interpretation. This final Part ponders what the introduction of such
a principle would mean along three vectors: first, what it would mean, on net,
for Congress's writing of statutes and the courts' overall willingness to strike
them down as unconstitutional; second, what it would mean for the tidiness of
the U.S. Code; and third, what it would mean for the counterpoint of judicial
review, statutory interpretation.
A. CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL OUTCOMES
At present, it is difficult to find a coherent pattern in the Court's willingness
to defer to congressional findings.' 77 Suppose that tomorrow the U.S. Supreme
Court issued the following unanimous statement in a constitutional case: "In the
174. See supra section III.B.
175. One might rejoin that Congress can be forced to stake a statute's constitutionality on an
identified factual predicate through the litigation process by the parties challenging constitutionality, the
structure of legal briefing, and the courts' own questions at oral argument. But once the statute leaves
Congress, it is no longer the Legislative Branch but the Executive Branch that defends the act and
identifies factual bases supporting constitutionality. Allowing Congress to pepper the legislative record
with a diffuse and often contradictory set of factual assertions possibly supporting constitutionality and
then leaving it up to the Solicitor General's office to identify and underline the most strategically
valuable assertions raises other troubling questions concerning the delegation of legislative power to the
Executive. See generally Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash. Reports of the Nondelegation Doc-
trine's Death are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. Riv. 1297 (2003).
176. On the importance of institutional precommitment, see David A. Super. Against Flexibility.
96 CORNHi. L. Raiv. 1375. 1378-79, 1386 (2011).
177. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND.
L.J. 1, I (2009) ("Although the courts often speak in terms of deference, they follow no consistent or
predictable pattern in deciding whether to defer in a given case.").
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past, we have erroneously purported to give equal deference to findings that
appeared in mere legislative history and those that were enacted into a statute,
satisfying the requirements of bicameralism and presentment. Henceforth, we
shall defer only to those findings of fact that are enacted into law." What would
be the net result of such a decision for congressional and judicial outcomes?
One can imagine a wide range of possibilities. If, as postulated earlier, courts
currently put little real weight on congressional findings even when they say
that they do,178 then there would be little impact on judicial outcomes. But
suppose that the Justices, or at least some of them, are not lying or deluded
when they tell us that congressional findings matter. What then?
First, there might be implications for the Court's average willingness to
invalidate statutes. Statutes supported only by findings in legislative history
would be more likely to fall prey to the Court's axe. Statutes supported by
enacted findings might receive only the same degree of deference that they
currently do, in which case (and for now holding constant Congress's response)
the Court would become even more activist in striking down acts of Congress
than it currently is.' 79 Or the courts might begin showing elevated deference to
statutes containing well-considered legislative findings and hence retreating
from some of the perceived activism of recent decades.
It is also possible that the Court's implementation of its new maxim would be
ideologically differentiated. As discussed earlier, judicial assertions about con-
gressional fact-finding are not ideologically directional-the liberals and conser-
vatives on the Court alike invoke and dismiss congressional findings.' 80 A shift
that elevated enactedness could result in one wing of the Court giving increased
deference to Congress on enacted facts while the other wing exploited the shift
by justifying invalidation of statutes without enacted facts under the new
principle and finding other reasons to condemn disfavored statutes with enacted
facts.
Then there is the question of how Congress would respond to the new judicial
attitude. Presumably, legislative draftspeople would begin making more fre-
quent use of enacted findings than they currently do. Over time, all constitution-
ally controversial statutes would contain enacted findings. If the courts took
seriously the idea that deference is owed on enacted facts, that could result in a
higher average level of constitutional validation or, to put it another way, a
decrease in the level of judicial activism. Or, sensing that Congress was too
uniformly evading judicial review through its new practice, the courts might
178. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
179. On judicial activism, see STFIANi A. LINoQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAl.
AcTivisM 29-46 (2009); Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Is the Roberts Court Especially Activist? A
Study of Invalidating (and Upholding) Federal, State, and Iocal Laws, 61 EMoRY L.J. 737. 737-38
(2012); Rorie Spill Solberg & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Activism, Ideology, and Federalism: Judicial
Behavior in Constitutional Challenges Before the Rehnquist Court, 1986-2000, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LiGAI.
STuD. 237, 239-41 (2006).
180. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
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begin to tamp down their appetite for congressional findings. In that case,
Congress might also begin to care less about enacting facts, and a new equilib-
rium would emerge where constitutional contestation focused little on findings.
The uncertainty and complex interactions of these potential paths point out
the difficulty of charting the likely effects of a modification in legal doctrine.
The overall political valence of a shift in the deference standard would depend
on the good faith of its implementers and their ongoing construction of the
norm. Still, it is quite plausible that observing the enactedness line could
enhance democratic values in the legislative process, the quality and integrity of
judicial review, and the relationship between Congress and the Court.
Focusing first on the legislative side, it is unlikely that Congress would react
to a shift in the deference line by packing statutes with long litanies of
unconsidered and unfocused assertions. That would likely have the effect on the
courts that boilerplate contracts of adhesion and disclosures have on consumers-
they would go unread and unenforced.'"' If judicial deference depended on
Congress asserting a few coherent characterizations about the world and asking
the courts to judge the statute on that basis, then congressional draftspersons
would have incentives to limit, focus, and sharpen.
Further, Congress would find it difficult to throw the kitchen sink into every
statute raising constitutional issues. Many of the same political constraints that
inhibit Congress from writing longer and more specified statutes for purposes of
interpretation would operate here as well.' 8 2 As previously noted, it would have
been politically difficult in 2009 for Congress to write into the ACA findings
justifying the statute on taxation grounds.' 8 3 Bicameralism and presentment are
meaningful barriers not only to the enactment of statutes but also to their
content.
Turning now to the judicial side, a plausible case could be made that, given
mainstream judicial values, doctrines, and institutional constraints, a meaning-
ful quorum of Justices would take seriously a set of focused and coherent
statutory findings, particularly those making explicit the normative understand-
ing that Congress sought to embody in law. This would not have to mean that
the courts would uphold statutes just because they contained concise and
focused findings. But by allowing Congress to direct the focal point for judicial
review onto congressional findings, the courts could signal willingness to afford
Congress some latitude to articulate an independent normative and constitu-
tional vision-a vision that the Court has thus far expressed only inconsistently.
From the vantage point of the courts, part of the problem seems to be a
distrust of Congress as a partner in the enterprise of constitutional law. Increas-
ingly in recent years, the courts have exhibited suspicion that Congress does not
181. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L.
Roiv. 647, 671-72 (2011) (showing that consumers generally ignore boilerplate contractual disclosures).
182. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 113. at 596-97 (discussing the need for deliberately ambiguous
statutory drafting in order to achieve consensus).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
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take seriously its responsibility to legislate constitutionality.' 84 The courts seem
to suspect that Congress focuses during the legislative process exclusively on
the immediate politics of the bill, leaving it to the Justice Department to cobble
together the constitutional defense post hoc.' 85 An emerging judicial doctrine
that promised deference to findings containing intertwined normative and posi-
tive claims-but only when Congress had demonstrated its seriousness of
purpose by staking its claim through enactment-could provide a blueprint for
Congress to regain the Court's trust and for the Court to regain Congress's trust.
B. AESTHETIC CONSIDERATIONS: CLUTTERING THE CODE
As noted earlier, legislative draftspersons have objected to the insertion of
factual findings into the statutes on the grounds that this would result in
"cluttering the U.S. Code."' 8  This aesthetic concern probably motivates the
official position of the statutory stylists in the House and Senate legislative
counsels' offices that findings of fact are better left to committee reports than
embedded in the text of acts.18 7 Such concerns cannot justify the current
practice of disregarding the enactedness line.
First, this aesthetic view may be predicated on an understanding that statutory
facts have "no force of law"' 8 and are thus equally potent in legislative history
and statutory texts. If this assumption is wrong, as I have argued, so is the
conclusion. Whatever cluttering of the U.S. Code might result from an en-
hanced emphasis on enacted findings would be well worth it to Congress if it
resulted in greater clarity and consistency on the role of congressional findings
in judicial review. And it would certainly be worth it if such a doctrinal shift
resulted in the courts upholding statutes that they might otherwise have
184. See Hillary Rodham Clinton with Goodwin Liu, Remarks, Separation Anxiety: Congress, the
Courts, and the Constitution, 91 G:o. LJ. 439, 447 (2003) (discussing "[t]he current Court's palpable
distrust of Congress"); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. Ri~v. 80, 80
(2001) (quoting Justice Scalia as saying that -if Congress is going to take the attitude that it will do
anything it can get away with and let the Supreme Court worry about the Constitution ... then perhaps
[the] presumption [of constitutionality] is unwarranted" and more generally discussing the trend in the
Supreme Court to show disrespect of Congress (quoting Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court, Address at the Telecommunications Law and Policy Symposium (Apr. 18, 2000))); Timothy
Zick, Marbury Ascendant: The Reinquist Court and the Power to Say What the Law Is." 59 WASH. &
Lili: L. Rtiv. 839, 843 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court's distrust of Congress in the context of
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
185. Indeed, this is pretty much what happened with the ACA. See Devins, supra note 114. at 1832
(reporting that Members of Congress paid little attention to constitutional issues during debates over the
ACA and "did not use the hearings as a vehicle to meaningfully engage in fact-finding that would
strengthen claims that (1) the ACA regulates economic activity pursuant to Congress's Commerce
Clause power or (2) the ACA's Medicaid expansion was noncoercive"). But see Rebecca E. Zietlow.
Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act. 72 OHIo ST. L.J. 1367. 1367-70 (2011)
(concluding that Congress did engage in deliberation over constitutional issues).
186. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ.. 132 F.3d 949. 967 n.IO (4th Cir. 1997). rev'd
en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
188. Brzonkala. 132 F.3d at 967 n.10 (quoting FRAZITl. Noit. & BRENNEKE. supra note 87).
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invalidated.
Second, the actual practice of enacted fact-finding to date does not suggest a
major cluttering problem. Enacted findings tend to be a short set of concise
assertions, rather than the sort of sprawling amalgam that often appears in
committee reports.189 It is of course possible that judicial emphasis on the
enactedness line would result in a greater prolixity of findings in statutes, but
for the reasons discussed in the previous section, that is unlikely.
Finally, concerns over cluttering are easily resolved by adopting the practice
already seen in a number of recent statutes of enacting findings of fact in a
public law and then embedding them in the U.S. Code as notes following the
operative portions of the statute.o90 The presentation of findings in the U.S.
Code has no consequence for their juridical effect because it is the text of the
Statutes at Large rather than the U.S. Code that controls.' 9 ' Statutory findings
could satisfy the bicameralism and presentment requirements for purposes of
judicial review without cluttering the U.S. Code at all.
C. FEEDBACK TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
This Article has focused on the significance of the enactment line for pur-
poses of judicial review on constitutional questions. As noted throughout, this
stealth issue parallels the hotly contested issue of using legislative history to
interpret statutes. This Article has considered the relevance of the statutory-
interpretation discussion for constitutional analysis. In closing, it is worth
turning the tables and pondering what relevance the constitutional-analysis issue
has for the statutory-interpretation issue. Two brief observations follow.
First, a more systematic and targeted use by Congress of enacted findings
could help to clarify some interpretive issues. Because neither textualists nor
purposivists object to considering enacted facts in interpretation, a movement of
Congress's foundational assumptions from legislative history to the statutory
text could provide greater clarity on Congress's intentions and reduce statutory
ambiguity.
Second, this Article's claim raises a challenge for textualists. Many of the
arguments for requiring findings to be enacted for purposes of constitutional
analysis derive from arguments made by textualists about interpretation. This
includes both formal arguments (that is, Congress itself has not found anything
until it has satisfied bicameralism and presentment)' 92 and functional ones (that
189. Compare the eight short factual assertions appearing at the beginning of the ACA. 42 U.S.C.§ 18091(2) (Supp. IV 2011), with the pages of detailed factual assertions appearing in the Senate
Judiciary Committee's report on the Violence Against Women Act. S. Riw. No. 101-545. at 30-34
(1990).
190. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
191. U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993): United
States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 98 & n.4 (1964): Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 423. 426 (1943).
192. See supra Part II.
2014] 679
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
is, legislative history is loser's history,9 3 using legislative history empowers
judges to "pick their friends out of the crowd,"l 9 4 and using legislative history
corrupts the legislative process).' 95 At present, textualists on interpretation seem
not to be textualists for purposes of findings in constitutional analysis-they
insist dogmatically on enactment when it comes to interpretation but seem
perfectly willing to attribute findings to Congress that appear in mere legislative
history when it comes to constitutionality. If the arguments have equal force in
both contexts, then either enactedness should be important in both contexts, or
else something is wrong with the textualist arguments. If nothing else, the
observations made in this Article shed light on controversies over interpretation.
CONCLusioN
This Article has argued that courts reviewing the constitutionality of congres-
sional statutes should defer only or principally to facts that are enacted, thus
satisfying the bicameralism and presentment requirements. Assertions of fact
made in committee reports or other legislative history are not findings of
Congress-to quote from the children's television classic Schoolhouse Rock,
they are "just a bill, sitting on Capitol Hill."' 96 Giving them weight in constitu-
tional analysis entails all of the pathologies of legislative process and judicial
manipulation of which textualists complain in the statutory-interpretation context.
Conversely, enacted findings of Congress deserve deference from the courts-
arguably more deference than they receive today. This is not, as commonly
asserted, because Congress has some comparative advantage over courts in
finding statistical or aggregate facts but because congressional findings usually
contain deeply normative claims of the kind that democracies entrust to legisla-
tures. When Congress is willing to stake the constitutionality of a statute on a
set of assertions about how the world is and ought to be, it sharpens judicial
review and exposes itself to risks in the courts of law and of public opinion. In
return, the courts need not accept Congress's assertions without question, but
nor should they reject them lightly.
193. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
196. Schoolhouse Rock! I'm Just a Bill (ABC television broadcast 1975).
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